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PENALIZING POVERTY: MAKING CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
PAY FOR THEIR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL THROUGH
RECOUPMENT AND CONTRIBUTION
Helen A. Anderson*
Over thirty years ago the United States Supreme Court upheld an Oregon statute
that allowed sentencing courts, with a number of important procedural safe-
guards, to impose on indigent criminal defendants the obligation to repay the cost
of their court appointed attorneys. The practice of ordering recoupment or contri-
bution (application fees or co-pays) of public defender attorney's fees is widespread,
although collection rates are unsurprisingly low. Developments since the Court's
decision in Fuller v. Oregon show that not only is recoupment not cost-effective,
but it too easily becomes an aspect of punishment, rather than legitimate cost-
recovery. In a number of jurisdictions, defendants are ordered to repay the cost of
their attorney regardless of their ability to pay and without any notice or opportu-
nity to be heard. Many are ordered to pay as a condition of probation or parole,
which means they pay under threat of incarceration. In these jurisdictions, re-
coupment violates the Sixth Amendment, as well as the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses. Constitutional problems are exacerbated by the potential for
ethical violations: public defenders may have conflicts of interest when they are re-
quired to both submit bills to the court and object to those bills on behalf of their
clients. And too often defendants are not warned at the outset that they may be re-
sponsible for attorney's fees or how those fees will be calculated. In any other
context, a client is entitled under the ethical rules to a clear statement of the basis
for the fee at the time the lawyer is engaged. In addition, the thirty years since
Fuller have verified that recoupment is bad policy because it imposes punishing
debt without real fiscal benefit. It is time to abandon practices that penalize defen-
dants for being poor and exercising their right to counsel.
I. INTRODUCTION
I don't know why they put in this at no cost. If you are found
innocent, it is no cost but if you are found guilty there is a
* Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like
to thank Katie Schmidt for her excellent research assistance, and Gary Manca for his volun-
teer research help. I would also like to thank Profs. John Junker, Jacqueline McMurtrie, Tom
Cobb, and Clark Lombardi for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
chance the state will require you to reimburse them for the at-
torney fees.'
We have all heard the ritual recital: 'You have the right to a law-
yer. If you want a lawyer and cannot afford one, a lawyer will be
appointed at no cost to you." Most people, even lawyers, believe
these public defenders and appointed counsel are free. In fact, in-
digent defendants can be made responsible for all or part of the
cost of their lawyers. This article argues that such recoupment
should be abandoned or, in the alternative, significantly restricted.3
Throughout the country, debts for defense fees and costs are
imposed on defendants either as recoupment (court-ordered re-
imbursement over time) or as contribution (a co-pay or application
fee imposed at the time of appointment) or both. Recoupment
might be a flat fee of several hundred dollars or the attorney's
hourly fee for representation. Contribution rates range from $10
to $200 per case, and may or may not be credited toward recoup-
ment.4 In addition, it is common for recoupment to be made a
condition of probation or parole, so that defendants are threat-
ened with incarceration if they fail to pay back the cost of their
lawyers.
These policies have their roots in Supreme Court precedent.
Over thirty years ago, the Court upheld an Oregon statute that al-
lowed sentencing courts, with a number of important procedural
safeguards, to impose the obligation to repay the cost of court ap-
pointed attorneys on convicted indigent defendants.5 The practice
of ordering recoupment or contribution is now widespread. How-
L. This was one detective's comment on the Miranda warnings he read to the ac-
cused. Cummings v. Polk, 475 F.3d 230, 233 (4th Cir. 2007) (rejecting habeas petition where
petitioner claimed Miranda warnings were flawed).
2. In my conversations with colleagues and other lawyers who have not practiced
criminal law, most have expressed surprise upon learning that defendants might have to
repay the state for appointed counsel. Indeed, the issue has received little notice from aca-
demics or even advocacy groups in the last twenty-five years. This may be changing-very
recently there have been a few articles focusing primarily on practices in particular states.
See, e.g., Kate Levine, If You Cannot Afford a Lawyer: Assessing the Constitutionality of Massachu-
setts's Reimbursement Statute, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 191, 210-13 (2007); Lola Vel.zquez-
Aguilti, Not Poor Enough: Why Wisconsin's System for Providing Indigent Defense Is Failing, 2006
Wis. L. RaV. 193, 213-15 (2006); Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy
of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2085 (2006)
(describing the trend in favor of application fees and various institutional actors' roles).
3. If the practice persists, however, perhaps the familiar Miranda warnings should be
revised. See Cummings, 475 F.3d at 233 (when reviewing the Miranda rights with the defen-
dant, the detective "crossed out the words 'at no cost'"); see also infra notes 149-152 and
accompanying text.
4. See infra Part II.
5. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
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ever, the history of these practices since Fuller v. Oregon' shows that
such programs all too often lead to serious constitutional viola-
tions, as well as ethical problems in the representation.
Furthermore, recoupment and contribution are poor policy, serv-
ing neither fiscal interests nor the purposes of punishment.
Recoupment and contribution should be abandoned or, at the very
least, sharply curtailed.
It may seem peculiar that defendants can be ordered to repay
the cost of a public defender, since, after all, only those too poor to
hire a lawyer qualify for public defense. Nevertheless, the Fuller
Court made clear that the guarantee of Gideon v. Wainright-that
counsel be provided to the indigent criminal defendant-is not
undercut so long as recovery is only sought from those who have
the ability to pay." The state has a legitimate interest in recovering,
funds from those with the means to pay without substantial hard-
ship.
But, in the years since the Court gave its qualified approval to
recoupment, recoupment practices in a significant number of ju-
risdictions have evolved into an aspect of punishment which no
longer serves the legitimate purpose of cost recovery. This occurs
in two major ways: (1) when the obligation to pay for attorneys'
fees is imposed without any finding of ability to pay, so that the ob-
ligation is imposed on the destitute as well as those with means,
and (2) when the obligation is imposed without notice and without
an opportunity to be heard as to ability to pay and as to the
amount imposed.
Jurisdictions that do not interpret Fuller narrowly, and thus do
not require a pre-imposition determination of ability to pay, as well
as notice and an opportunity to be heard, are imposing debts for
legal services in violation of the Sixth Amendment, as well as the
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendment. If the obligation is imposed regardless of
ability to pay, the potential "chilling" effect on the exercise of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is profound. As indigents weigh
the cost of accepting appointed counsel, they may realize that even
if it is never enforced, a judgment for attorney's fees can affect
credit and job or housing searches. Such a judgment becomes a
penalty on an indigent's right to counsel.
Furthermore, basic due process is violated if the obligation is
imposed without notice and opportunity to be heard regarding the
6. Id.
7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8. Fuller, 417 U.S. at 46, 53-56.
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ability to pay or the amount. A criminal defendant should be enti-
tled to at least as much process as a civil debtor who has an
obligation reduced to judgment. The Court applies a blended due
process and equal protection test to issues involving poverty and
access to the courts. Recoupment programs without the safeguards
of Fuller fail this test. In addition, a separate equal protection viola-
tion results when indigent defendants are threatened with
incarceration for failure to pay as a condition of probation or pa-
role; defendants who owe their private attorneys money are not
similarly threatened. The essence of these constitutignal violations
is procedural: without procedures to ensure that the debt is im-
posed only on those with the ability to pay, in a reasonable amount,
and without the threat of imprisonment, recoupment goes beyond
legitimate cost recovery and penalizes a fundamental right.
The persistent constitutional deficiencies of recoupment and
contribution programs are exacerbated by professional ethics
problems. Recoupment and contribution may create conflicts of
interest for defense counsel, who must submit the bill and who
may benefit directly from the order. At the same time, these attor-
neys are ethically responsible for objecting to the order on behalf
of their client, and for raising challenges to the process. In addi-
tion, most recoupment programs do not meet the requirements
that most professional codes set for attorneys fees. Defendants are
not apprised, prior to the representation, that they will be charged
and on what basis. There is no assurance that the fees will be "rea-
sonable." 9 Instead, an amount is simply imposed at sentencing.
And despite the fact that defendants may end up paying for the
entire cost of their attorney, they are denied the right to counsel of
choice. Courts have justified the denial of choice to defendants
who receive appointed counsel on the basis that they are not pay-
ing. But the line between those who retain counsel privately and
those who enjoy the services of court-appointed counsel becomes
less clear with recoupment and contribution.
Recoupment and contribution have also proven to be bad pol-
icy. Programs that comply with due process requirements will not
be cost-effective, but rather will add to the heavy load of fines and
costs already imposed upon convicted offenders. This burden will
fall only on those who decide to rehabilitate, and it will only make
that rehabilitation more difficult. Recoupment is a poor sentenc-
ing tool, as it bears no relationship to the severity of the crime or
the defendant's actions, but rather depends on the complexity of
the proceedings. Thus, defense cost recovery should be aban-
9. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2008).
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doned. If recoupment must be retained for political reasons, it
should be a purely civil obligation imposed only on those found to
have the ability to pay, and only with the basic due process protec-
tions that attend the imposition and enforcement of any other civil
judgment.
Part II of this article gives an overview of recoupment and con-
tribution as it is practiced throughout the country. Part III
describes the constitutional limits to recoupment, as laid out in a
series of Supreme Court cases from the 1970s. Part IV describes
how jurisdictions have since diverged on questions of imposition,
amount, and enforcement, and shows how a significant number of
jurisdictions now treat recoupment as an aspect of punishment.
Part V shows that recoupment violates the Sixth Amendment, and
the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments in jurisdictions that do not provide the
safeguards of a pre-imposition determination of ability to pay or
notice and opportunity to be heard on the amount and ability to
pay. Part VI argues that many recoupment programs lead to legal
representation that violates the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, and consequently the professional codes of most
jurisdictions. These ethical violations exacerbate the constitutional
problems with many recoupment and contribution programs. Part
VII argues that recoupment and contribution are bad policy be-
cause, even when implemented constitutionally, they add to an
already crushing financial burden on defendants and are rarely
cost-effective. Finally, Part VIII makes specific recommendations.
II. OVERVIEW OF RECOUPMENT AND CONTRIBUTION
The following is a general overview of recoupment ° and contri-
bution to give the reader a sense of how both operate throughout
the United States. As will be seen, there is significant variation both
among and within jurisdictions. The overview is based on a study of
statutes, cases, and what reports exist. Such sources can give only
part of the picture, however, since recoupment, in practice, can
10. Terminology can be confusing, as the distinction between recoupment and contri-
bution can blur, and some sources use the term "reimbursement." Here, I use the term
"recoupment" to refer to when a defendant is ordered by a court to repay all or part of the
expense of counsel. "Contribution" refers to a request (either by a court or indigency
screening agency) to make a payment before or at the start of proceedings. If the defendant
does not make the contribution payment, many jurisdictions allow the court to order re-
payment. Thus recoupment on occasion will include what was initially a request for
contribution if the defendant does not or cannot pay at the outset and is ordered to pay by
the court. See infra pp. 332, 333-34.
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also be governed by county rules, particular contract terms for
public defense in an area, local practice, and judicial discretion."
Unfortunately, most jurisdictions do not keep good records on en-
forcement and collection of recoupment and contribution.
12
To understand recoupment, it is important to know something
about the state's obligation to provide counsel to the indigent. In
Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court held that indigent crimi-
nal defendants charged with felonies in state courts are entitled to
counsel at public expense under the Sixth Amendment." The
Court had already ruled that federal defendants were entitled to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment, 4 as were state capital defen-
dants under the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Until Gideon, however,
the Court had resisted imposing the requirement of court-
appointed counsel more broadly, recognizing that the expense to
the states would be substantial. But since Gideon, the constitu-
tional right to counsel has expanded to include defendants
charged with certain misdemeanors, 6 many defendants facing
probation revocation," minors charged in juvenile delinquency
proceedings,' convicted defendants appealing as of right,'9 and
more. In addition, many more indigents have a statutory right to
court-appointed counsel.20
11. An in-depth national report that takes all these local variations into account is be-
yond the scope of this article. The Spangenberg Group has done a number of reports on
indigent defense, many on behalf of the ABA. See The Spangenberg Group,
http://www.spangenberggroup.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2008). A 1986 national report
discussed expenditures and cost recovery for indigent defense, including recoupment pro-
grams. ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CONTAINING THE COSTS OF
INDIGENT DEFENSE PROGRAMS: ELIGIBILITY SCREENING AND COST RECOVERY PROCEDURES
(1986). In 2001, the group followed up with a report on contribution programs. JAMES
DOWNING, THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, PUBLIC DEFENDER APPLICATION FEES: 2001 UPDATE
(2001), available at http://www.spangenberggroup.com/pub_list.htm. In addition, the
group has done studies for individual counties and states on public defense.
12. SeeWright & Logan, supra note 2, at 2063 n.78.
13. 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963).
14. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
15. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
16. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
17. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (setting forth criteria for deter-
mining when provision of counsel is necessary to meet due process requirements).
18. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
19. SeeDouglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-58 (1963).
20. Parents and children involved in parental termination or dependency proceed-
ings, for example, often have a statutory right to counsel. See, e.g., Laura K. Abel & Max
Rettig, State Statues Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J.
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 245, 245-46 (July-Aug. 2006);Jean Koh Peters, How Children Are Heard
in Child Protective Proceedings, in the U.S. and Around the World in 2005: Survey Findings, Initial
Observations, and Areas for Further Study, 6 NEV. LJ. 966 app. C. at 1074-81 (2006) (compiling
information on all fifty states' practice with respect to the appointment of counsel for chil-
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Soon after this obligation to provide counsel was placed upon
the states, many jurisdictions began to look for ways to recoup the
costs of defense counsel from indigent defendants. The majority of
criminal defendants qualify for appointed counsel-about 80% of
state prosecutions, and 66% of federal cases." Even when provided
cheaply,22 public defense is a significant part of most county, city
and/or state budgets, and the recipients of these services are not a
popular group. Thus, there has been a persistent effort to move
the costs of indigent defense onto the defendants themselves.
One way to recover costs is through recoupment: ordering de-
fendants to repay all or part of the cost of counsel, usually over a
period of time. Another approach, more popular in recent years, is
contribution: an upfront "application fee" or "co-pay." Contribu-
tion is generally thought of as a small payment that the defendant
can afford to make at the time of appointment of counsel. How-
ever, the line between recoupment and contribution is not always
clear, especially when contribution fees can be as high as $200, and
defendants who do not pay contribution at the outset can be or-
dered to pay it as a term of their sentence or as a condition of
probation.
A. Recoupment
Recoupment refers to a judicial order requiring the defendant
to reimburse the government for the cost of representation. Such
recoupment orders can take various forms. The order might be
made a part of the judgment and sentence, and collected in the
dren in dependency cases). Federal law provides criminal defendants facing probation revo-
cation with a right to counsel. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1.
21. "Publicly-financed counsel represented about 66 percent of federal felony defen-
dants in 1998 as well as 82 percent of felony defendants in the 75 most populous counties in
1996." Press Release, United States Department ofJustice Bureau ofJustice Statistics, Two of
Three Felony Defendants Represented by Publicly Financed Counsel (Nov. 29, 2000), avail-
able at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/iddcpr.htm.
22. Studies have repeatedly shown that indigent defense is underfunded throughout
the country. See, e.g., Gideon's Broken Promise: America's Continuing Quest For Equal Justice: A
Report on the American Bar Association's Hearings on the Right to Counsel in Criminal Proceedings,
A.B.A STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, Dec. 2004, at 7-9, [here-
inafter Gideon's Broken Promise] available at http://wV.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/
defender/brokenpromise/execsummary.pdf; Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The
Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN.
SURV. Am. L. 783, 816-821. Even so, "combined state and county expenditures on indigent
defense in fiscal year 2002 totaled approximately $2.8 billion nationwide." Am. BAR AsS'N,
GUIDELINES ON CONTRIBUTION FEES FOR COSTS OF COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (Aug.
2004) (adopted by ABA House of Delegates as Recommendation No. 110), https://
www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/recl 10.pdf.
WINTER 2009]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
same way as fines or other costs. It might also be a civil judgment,
enforced as would any civil judgment. Defense costs include not
only attorney's fees, but also investigative and expert services.23 In
1986, thirty-six states had statutes that authorized recoupment, and
the remaining states allowed cost recovery (which might include
attorney's fees) at the discretion of the trial judge.24 In addition, a
majority of counties permit judges to order recoupment.2 Re-
coupment schemes vary in whether they apply to acquitted
defendants, whether they apply to defendants who are sent to
prison, whether recoupment payment can be made a condition of
probation and/or parole, and how fees are determined.
Who pays recoupment and to whom payment is made. Some recoup-
ment statutes clearly apply only to convicted defendants. 2 6 In some
states, however, fees can be recouped from defendants even if they
are acquitted,27 there is a mistrial, or the case is reversed on ap-
peal. s Most schemes suggest that payment goes to an arm of the
23. The order in Fuller v. Oregon required defendant to reimburse the state for fees for
a defense investigator. 417 U.S. 40, 41-42 (1974); see also Dennis A. Goschka, Recoupment
Statutes: Free Defense--For a Price, 53 J. URB. L. 89, 93 (1975-76) (discussing defense-related
services to which an indigent may be entitled).
24. SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 33. A few courts have reversed recoupment
orders for lack of statutory authority. E.g., State v. Rideau, 943 So. 2d 559, 579-82 (La. Ct.
App. 2006); Williams v. State, 711 P.2d 116, 118 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (overruled by stat-
ute, OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 22-1355.14 (West 2008)); Commonwealth v. Terry, 368 A.2d 279,
279-80 (Pa. 1977) (holding no statutory authority for recoupment when the defendant was
represented by a lawyer from a private non-profit organization).
25. SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 33.
26. E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-12-25 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 938.29(1) (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-4529(1) (2007) (application fee of $100 refunded if defendant acquitted); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-455 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 7-32a-1 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163
(2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.160 (2007) ("Costs may be imposed only upon a convicted
defendant .... ); W. VA. CODE § 29-21-16(g) (2007) (when "adverse judgment has been
rendered against" indigent).
27. IOWA CODE ANN. § 815.9 (2007); Wis. ADMIN. CODE [PD] § 6.015(1) (2007), cited
in Velizquez-Aguili, supra note 2, at 214; State v. Haas, 927 A.2d 1209, 1210-11 (N.H. 2007)
(rejecting due process challenge to recoupment from acquitted defendant and citing twelve
other jurisdictions that allow recoupment from acquitted persons); State v. Kottenbroch,
319 N.W.2d 465, 473-74 (N.D. 1982) (finding no constitutional infirmity where statute ap-
plied to convicted as well as acquitted defendants).
28. People v. Bramlett, 455 N.E.2d 1092 (Il1. App. Ct. 1983) (upholding recoupment
of fees incurred during mistrial); State v. Hill, No. 03-0560, 2004 WL 433844 (Iowa Ct. App.
Mar. 10, 2004) (upholding award of recoupment for fees incurred during mistrial); State v.
Johnson, No. 01-0889, 2003 WL 118212 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2003) (upholding recoup-
ment order where defendant's conviction was reversed on appeal); State v. Hubbel, 20 P.3d
111, 116 (Mont. 2001) (upholding trial court's authority to order repayment of attorney's
fees for first trial and successful appeal as well as second trial), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Hendricks, 75 P.3d 1268, 1270-71 (Mont. 2003). Thus, in these jurisdictions, a de-
fendant who must be retried because of prosecutorial orjudicial error will owe more than a
defendant who received a fair trial the first time.
[VOL. 42:2
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government.29 However, in a few jurisdictions, statutes specify that
payment shall go to the appointed attorney or public defender. °
How recoupment payment is enforced: Recoupment orders may be
enforced as civil judgments, part of the criminal sentence, a condi-
tion of probation, or some combination thereof.31  Some
jurisdictions specifically allow contempt proceedings for non-
payment, while others disallow it.3 2 When recoupment is ordered as
a condition of probation or suspended sentence, it is often part of
a package of financial obligations on which the defendant must
make regular payments under threat of revocation and incarcera-
tion. 3 In a few jurisdictions, the court may order the defendant to
"work off' a recoupment debt through public service.34
How recoupment is calculated: Recoupment may simply be the
hourly rate of the appointed attorney times the number of hours
worked on behalf of the defendant, in addition to investigative or
expert fees. Sometimes this hourly rate is established by statute or
rule.35 Other jurisdictions set a schedule of flat fees for various
types of cases.36 Some courts are given great discretion in setting
29. See SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 42-45. The report recommends that re-
coupment be collected by "separate state, county, or private collection agency" rather than
public defenders or probation departments. Id. at 72.
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f) (2006); Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.090 (2007) (directing public
defender to file notice of lien); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-114 (2007) (requiring payments to
be made to the office of the state public defender); Wis. STAT. § 977.076 (2007) (directing
the state public defender to notify the court when defendant fails to make recoupment
payments).
31. See SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 42. Federal circuits are divided on
whether 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f) can be enforced only civilly, or whether recoupment may be
made a condition of probation. See infra notes 181-189 and accompanying text.
32. For example, Alabama, Illinois, Montana and Utah statutes specifically allow con-
tempt proceedings. ALA. CODE § 15-12-25 (2006); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3.1 (g) (2007);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-115 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32a-7 (2007). California and
Oregon do not permit the use of contempt for enforcing recoupment. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 987.5 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 151.487 (2007).
33. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 11 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.01.160 (2008).
34. Such "work-off" provisions are subject to constitutional challenge for violating the
Thirteenth Amendment as well as the Sixth Amendment. See infra notes 133-137 and ac-
companying text.
35. E.g., IOWA CODE § 815.7 (2007) ("[T]he reasonable compensation shall be calcu-
lated on the basis of seventy dollars per hour for class 'A' felonies, sixty-five dollars per hour
for class 'B' felonies, and sixty dollars per hour for all other cases."); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-32-08 (2007) (rebuttable presumption that $75 per hour is reasonable fee); OR. REV.
STAT. § 151.505(2) ("compensation of counsel is determined by reference to a schedule of
compensation established by the commission."). See SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at
37-38.
36. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-33-7-6 (2007) (recoupment amount set at $100 per felony,
$50 per misdemeanor). But see Banks v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1050, 1052 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006) (noting conflicting Indiana statutory provisions relating to recoupment); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 22, § 1355.14 (2007) (recoupment set at $250 for a felony guilty plea, $1000 for a felony
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the recoupment amount,37 others are required to base the amount
on clear evidence.3 s Trial courts generally have authority to waive
all or part of the fee .
Despite the enthusiasm for recoupment in state and local gov-
ernments, such programs have never been proven cost-effective. A
1984Justice Department study revealed that less than 10 percent of
recoupment orders were collected.40 Furthermore, a 1986 study
showed that while it is possible for revenues to exceed costs in a
tightly run and carefully administered recoupment program, in
most instances recoupment programs were not cost-effective.4 ' The
recoupment program reviewed by the Supreme Court in a 1972
42case spent $400,000 collecting $17,000 over two years.
Since that 1972 decision, recoupment has become just one of an
ever-growing number of financial obligations imposed on con-
victed criminal defendants, making repayment even less likely.
43
Defendants, whose job prospects are dim and who are often labor-
ing under massive accrued child-support debt, generally do not
have the resources to pay restitution, fines, fees, and other court
costs, let alone recoupment debt.
44
jury trial); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5238 (2007) (directing defender general to annually
calculate the average direct cost per case type, and setting forth percentage of this average
cost for which defendant will be responsible, depending on income level). Fees may be
established at the county level or through other mechanisms that do not appear in statutes
or case law. See SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 37-38. In Wisconsin, for example, the
State Public Defender has established a schedule for reimbursement in the administrative
code under which reimbursement for misdemeanor representation is $240 per charge,
while a class A or B felony costs $1,200. Defendants receive a steep discount, however, if they
prepay their fees within 60 days: $60 for each misdemeanor charge, $120 per felony. Wis.
ADMIN. CODE [PD] §§ 6.01, 6.02. See also VelAzquez-Aguili, supra note 2, at 213-14 (discuss-
ing reimbursement provisions).
37. E.g., People v. Brown, 506 N.E.2d 1059 (111. App. Ct. 1987) (record that trial took
four days was sufficient to justify reimbursement award of $500).
38. E.g., Fitch v. Belshaw, 581 F. Supp. 273, 278 (D. Or. 1984) (minimum due process
requires written records of the attorney's time, among other things); People v. Poindexter,
210 Cal. App. 3d 803, 811 (1989) ("court must review evidence of the actual costs" before
setting recoupment amount); Commonwealth v. Opara, 362 A.2d 305, 312 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1976) (court cannot order recoupment based on arbitrary fee calculation).
39. SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 33-35.
40. Richard J. Wilson, Compelling Indigent Defendants to Pay the Cost of Counsel Adds Up to
Bad Policy, Bad Law, 3 CRIM.JUST. 16, 43 (1988).
41. SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 61-67.
42. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 133 (1972).
43. See RACHEL L. MCLEAN & MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, BUREAU OFJUSTICE ASSISTANCE
& COUNCIL OF STATE GoV'TS JUSTICE CTR., REPAYING DEBTS (2007), http://
www.reen trypolicy.org/jcpublications/repaying-debts-full-report;file.




Realizing that recoupment was not always sound fiscal policy,
states turned to another method of cost recovery-contribution.
Contribution can take many forms and may be referred to as "ap-
plication fees," "co-pays," "user fees," "administrative fees," or
"registration fees."4 5 Contribution is usually a fixed sum imposed at
the time of appointment. Amounts set by statute can range from
$10 to $480 and are usually tied to the offense charged.46 Contribu-
tion might also be imposed at the county level, regardless of
whether there is a fee set by the stateY. In almost every jurisdiction,
the court may waive the fee. 8 If the defendant does not make the
payment, counsel will typically not be denied, but the court might
order future payment enforced through probation revocation,
garnishment, or other coercive methods . Thus, like recoupment,
contribution may become a judgment debt and/or condition of
probation.
In most jurisdictions, contribution is a supplement, not an alter-
native, to traditional recoupment. 50 The contribution amount is
either credited toward the recoupment order or treated as a sepa-
rate charge.5 Many states authorize both contribution and
recoupment, but do not specify whether contribution should be
credited toward recoupment.
52
Contribution programs can be more cost-effective than recoup-
ment, since the contribution fee is sought at the time of
appointment and does not require a hearing or court action unless
it is to become part of the sentence or formal collection proce-
dures. Reports on the rates of collection are mixed. According to
45. Wright & Logan, supra note 2, at 2052.
46. See id. at 2052 n.20 (listing statutes authorizing contribution fees).
47. DOWNING, supra note 11, at 20-25. This report discusses county level fees imposed
in various counties in Arizona, California, Georgia, Ohio and Washington.
48. Florida statute apparently does not permit the court to waive the $50 application
fee. FLA STAT. §§ 27.52, 938.29 (2008). This lack of a waiver provision is probably unconsti-
tutional. See Hanson v. Passer, 13 F.3d 275 (8th Cir. 1994) (granting habeas relief when
partially indigent defendant denied counsel for failure to first pay $1000).
49. Wright & Logan, supra note 2, at 2053-54.
50. Id. at 2065.
51. For example, the following statutes specify that the contribution fee is in addition
to recoupment: FLA. STAT. § 938.29(1) (c) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-455.1 (2007); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 29-07-01.1 (2007). Other statutes make clear that contribution is to be cred-
ited toward reimbursement. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.5 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 5238 (2007).
52. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-584 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 120.36
(2007); Mo. REv. STAT. § 600.090 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 604-A:2-d, 604-A-9
(2007).
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one study, only 6 to 20 percent of contribution is collected.3 Yet
other studies suggest some jurisdictions are getting better at col-
lecting fees of all kinds. 4 Payment at the time of appointment is
essentially voluntary because appointment of counsel may not con-
stitutionally be conditioned on payment,55 but indigents may not
always realize this. Accordingly, jurisdictions that collect the con-
tribution fee before proceedings, rather than at the conclusion of
the case, have a greater collection rate. 6
Both contribution and recoupment apply to defendants who
have been determined indigent-unable to pay for private counsel.
Indigency is not always binary; some defendants may be adjudged
indigent but able to contribute, or partially indigent.57 These de-
fendants may be ordered to sign a promissory note for part of the
cost,5" or simply be ordered to make partial payment at the time of
appointment or shortly after.59 (The "co-pays" or "application fees"
demanded of all indigents in many jurisdictions can be seen as an
effort to redefine all indigents as partially indigent.) In practical
effect, such "partial indigency" orders are often indistinguishable
from recoupment orders. A finding of partial indigency raises
many of the same issues as a recoupment order imposed on a fully
indigent defendant: e.g., is the right to counsel impermissibly
"chilled" by an order of partial payment? Has the defendant been
afforded notice and opportunity to contest the finding of partial
indigency and the amount of payment ordered?
53. DOWNING, supra note 11 at 29. Yet the same report notes that 90% of defendants in
Pima County paid the $25 application fee. Id. at 20.
54. David E. Olson & Gerard F. Ramker, Crime Does Not Pay, But Criminals May: Factors
Influencing the Imposition and Collection of Probation Fees, 22 JUST. Sys. J. 29, 30 (2001).
"[j] urisdictions that restrict the use of installment plans, require payments within relatively
short periods of time (between two and four weeks) and strictly enforce penalties for non-
payment have higher fee and fine collection rates." Id. at 31. These findings support the
idea that up-front contribution fees are easier to collect than recoupment.
55. Hanson v. Passer, 13 F.3d 275, 279-80 (8th Cir. 1994).
56. DOWNING, supra note 11 at 28.
57. The difference between such "partially indigent" defendants and the "indigent but
ordered to repay" is one of degree. If the defendant is ordered to pay immediately or within
a short time (based on the court's evaluation of the defendant's financial situation at the
initial application for court-appointed counsel), then the defendant has essentially been
judged partially indigent. If, however, the defendant is found indigent but then ordered to
repay the entire sum (and especially if the defendant is ordered to repay without any con-
sideration of the defendant's financial situation), then the defendant is an indigent who
must repay. In between are those who are found indigent but then ordered to pay a portion
of the costs of counsel over a limited time upon a finding that they have the ability to pay.
"[A] defendant's level of financial resources is a point on a spectrum rather than a classifica-
tion." Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 n.8 (1983).
58. See SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 52; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.020
(2007).
59. SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 49.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF RECOUPMENT AND CONTRIBUTION:
James, Fuller, AND Bearden
In a series of decisions several decades ago, the Supreme Court
upheld recoupment but delineated the constitutional limits of re-
coupment programs. Indigent defendants may be ordered to
reimburse the state for the cost of counsel if the court finds, at the
time of the order, that the defendant has the ability to make re-
payment or will be able to pay.60 Further, repayment may be made a
condition of probation, and probation may be revoked for failure
to pay, but only where the trial court makes findings that the fail-
ure to pay was willful or that the defendant did not make a bona
fide effort to acquire the resources to pay.6' Recoupment may be
enforced through civil judgment procedures as long as recoup-
ment debtors are afforded the same rights and protections as other
61civil judgment debtors.
In 1972, the Court struck down a Kansas recoupment statute on
equal protection grounds in James v. Strange. Under the statute,
the defendant had to pay the cost of defense within 60 days of re-
ceiving notice of the amount. If not paid within that time, the
amount was reduced to a civil judgment and began to accrue in-
terest. The judgment could then be enforced like any civil
judgment except that the statute specifically provided that "[n] one
of the exemptions provided for in the code of civil procedure shall
apply to any such judgment," except the homestead exemption."'
According to the Court, by stripping the defendant of the ordinary
civil protections afforded other civil judgment debtors, the statute
offended the Equal Protection Clause.6' Thus, any recoupment
statute that relies on enforcement of civil judgments must not dis-
criminate against recoupment debtors.
The James court did not endorse recoupment as a policy, and
noted, "Misguided laws may nonetheless be constitutional. '"6 6 The
Court was struck by the harshness of the law, which removed lim-
its on garnishment and exemptions for severe personal and
family illness.6 ' The Court acknowledged the state's legitimate in-
terest in recoupment, but concluded: "State recoupment laws,
60. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
61. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668 (1983); Fuller, 417 U.S. at 48 n.9.
62. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128,141-42 (1972).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 130 n. 3 (quoting former KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4513 (Supp. 1971)).
65. Id. at 141-42.
66. Id. at 133.
67. Id. at 135.
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notwithstanding the state interests they may serve, need not blight
in such discriminatory fashion the hopes of indigents for self-
sufficiency and self-respect. The statute before us embodies ele-
ments of punitiveness and discrimination which violate the rights
of citizens to equal treatment under the law.""8
Two years later, in Fuller v. Oregon,9 the Court upheld an Oregon
recoupment statute against various constitutional challenges. Fuller
was the last word on recoupment from the Supreme Court, and
therefore requires careful study. Lower courts have differed on
how narrowly or broadly to read the decision.
The Court framed the question presented as "whether Oregon
may constitutionally require a person convicted of a criminal of-
fense to repay the State the costs of providing him with effective
representation of counsel, when he is indigent at the time of the
criminal proceedings but subsequently acquires the means to bear
the costs of his legal defense."' The defendant had been sentenced
to five years probation conditioned in part on repayment of the
costs of his defense. In upholding the statute, the Court relied on
four features of the Oregon statute: (1) the statute applied only to
convicted persons; (2) the sentencing court could not order re-
payment unless it found the defendant "is or will be able to pay;
71
(3) a convicted person ordered to repay could at any time petition
the court for remission if payment would impose manifest hard-
ship on the defendant or his immediate family;72 and (4) no
convicted person could be held in contempt for failure to repay if
the default was not an intentional refusal to obey the court nor due
73to a failure to make a bona fide effort to pay.
The Court found the Oregon statute did not run afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause under James v. Strange because it provided
that where the obligation was enforced as a civil judgment the re-
coupment debtor received all the protections afforded other civil
judgment debtors. v4 While the dissent argued that the threat of im-
prisonment through probation revocation violated equal
protection because such a threat could not be used against con-
victed persons who failed to pay a private attorney,75 the majority
and concurring justice found that argument not properly raised.76
68. Id. at 141-42.
69. 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
70. Id. at 41.
71. Id. at43 n.5 (quoting OR. REv. STAT. § 161.665 (1973)).
72. Id. at 45-46.
73. Id. at 46.
74. Id. at 47.
75. Id. at 60-61 (Marshall,J, dissenting).
76. Id. at 48 n.9; id. at 57 (Douglas,J., concurring).
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Nor did the majority seem particularly receptive to the contention:
"[T]he imposition of a repayment requirement upon those for
whom counsel was appointed but not upon those who hired their
own counsel simply does not constitute invidious discrimination
against the poor.,,77
The Fuller Court also rejected the argument that the recoup-
ment statute infringed on the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel by "chilling" the exercise of that right. 8 The defense
argued that indigents might refuse the offer of a public defender
once they knew that they would be ultimately responsible for the
cost.
79 But the Court reasoned that, at the time of need, nothing
stood in the way of an indigent obtaining counsel at no cost. "The
Oregon statute is carefully designed to insure that only those who
actually become capable of repaying the State will ever be obliged
to do so. "s° Further, the Court held that requiring an indigent to
take some account of potential cost was not unconstitutional:
A defendant in a criminal case who is just above the line sepa-
rating the indigent from the nonindigent must borrow
money, sell off his meager assets, or call upon his family or
friends in order to hire a lawyer. We cannot say that the Con-
stitution requires that those only slightly poorer must remain
forever immune from any obligation to shoulder the expenses
of their legal defense, even when they are able to pay without
hardship.8'
Throughout the decision, the Fuller majority relied on the limi-
tations of the Oregon statute to defeat constitutional challenges.
The fact that the statute only imposed the repayment obligation on
those who would be able to pay was referred to in rejecting the
equal protection argument,8 2 the "chilling" of the right to counsel
argument,8 3 an argument that the statute discriminated unconstitu-
tionally based on wealth,84 and an argument that the statute
77. Id. at 48 n.9. The majority also found that equal protection was not offended by re-
couping only from defendants who were convicted, rather than from all indigent
defendants. Id. at 49-50. The court found the distinction between those convicted and those
acquitted "wholly noninvidious." Id. at 49.
78. Id. at 54.
79. Id. at 51.
80. Id. at 53 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 53-54.
82. Id. at 50.
83. Id. at 51-53.
84. Id. at 53 n.12.
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penalized the exercise of a constitutional right.8 5 Yet, as the next
section will show, many jurisdictions read Fuller to allow the imposi-
tion of a recoupment debt with no finding of the ability to pay, as
long as the debtor is never imprisoned for poverty alone. These
jurisdictions seem to conflate the imposition of the debt with en-
forcement of the debt-a conflation that is not supported by Fuller.
The Fuller court concluded that "Oregon's legislation is tailored to
impose an obligation only upon those with a foreseeable ability to
meet it, and to enforce that obligation only against those who actu-
ally become able to meet it without hardship."8
The Fuller Court did not give much discussion to the Oregon
statute's conditions for contempt or probation revocation when a
defendant failed to make payment, although it noted that the de-
fendant could not be imprisoned unless the default was intentional
or in bad faith. 7 Almost ten years later, however, in Bearden v. Geor-
gia,8 the Court held that it was unconstitutional to imprison
automatically a defendant who failed to pay a fine. The Court con-
cluded, relying on the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,
that the trial court could not revoke probation unless the trial
court found that the defendant willfully refused to pay or did not
make bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to pay.89 "To do
otherwise would deprive the probationer of his conditional free-
dom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay
the fine. Such deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental
fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment."'9
Bearden concerned the non-payment of a fine, not defense fees.
The purpose of a fine is punishment, and so the Court went on to
hold:
If the probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide
efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court must con-
sider alternate measures of punishment other than
imprisonment. Only if alternate measures are not adequate to
meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence may
the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient
bona fide efforts to pay.91
85. Id. at 54.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 46.
88. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
89. Id. at 672.
90. Id. at 672-73 (footnote omitted).
91. Id. at 672.
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This reasoning underscores the punitive purpose of a fine, but it
is inapplicable to recoupment. The state's interest in recoupment
is not punishment, but simply a fiscal interest in recovering money
expended and in discouraging fraudulent assertions of indigence.
Thus, Bearden's due process requirement that the court make par-
ticular findings about the defendant's ability to pay before
revoking probation are applicable to revocation for failure to pay
recoupment costs, but the subsequent suggestion that the court
consider alternative punishments is not relevant to recoupment.
NeitherJames nor Fuller suggests that recoupment is punishment.
As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has inferred, James, Fuller
and Bearden together generate the following rule:
From the Supreme Court's pronouncements in James, Fuller,
and Bearden, five basic features of a constitutionally acceptable
attorney's fees reimbursement program emerge. First, the
program under all circumstances must guarantee the indigent
defendant's fundamental right to counsel without cumber-
some procedural obstacles designed to determine whether he
is entitled to court-appointed representation. Second, the
state's decision to impose the burden of repayment must not
be made without providing him notice of the contemplated
action and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Third, the
entity deciding whether to require repayment must take cog-
nizance of the individual's resources, the other demands on
his own and family's finances, and the hardships he or his
family will endure if repayment is required. The purpose of
this inquiry is to assure repayment is not required as long as
he remains indigent. Fourth, the defendant accepting court-
appointed counsel cannot be exposed to more severe collec-
tion practices than the ordinary civil debtor. Fifth, the
indigent defendant ordered to repay his attorney's fees as a
condition of work-release, parole, or probation cannot be im-
prisoned for failing to extinguish his debt as long as his
default is attributable to his poverty, not his contumacy.9
These features have not been embraced by all jurisdictions. Not
all courts and legislatures have recognized the constitutional
92. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 141 (1972) (noting that the important state in-
terests represented by recoupment laws include cost recovery and protection from fraud);
see also Taylor v. Rhode Island, 101 F.3d 780, 783 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding statute imposing
monthly fee on probationers was not punishment for Ex Post Facto purposes because stat-
ute's goal was reimbursement rather than retribution or deterrence).
93. Alexander v.Johnson, 742 F.2d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
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requirements that emerge from a careful reading of the Supreme
Court precedent. In a significant number of jurisdictions recoup-
ment law has devolved into a punitive regime that penalizes
indigents for having appointed counsel, regardless of their ability
to pay.
IV. JURISDICTIONS HAVE DIVERGED IN THEIR
INTERPRETATIONS OF Fuller
Over the last three decades, jurisdictions have interpreted Fuller
differently depending on whether they see recoupment as another
aspect of punishment or simply as cost collection from those who
are able to pay. Some jurisdictions interpret Fuller as a green light
to recover attorneys' fees in the same way that any criminal fine
may be recovered. Others recognize that recoupment must be
carefully restricted to comply with due process, equal protection,
and the Sixth Amendment.
A. Not AllJurisdictions Determine the Defendant's Ability to Pay
Before Imposing Recoupment
One key way in which jurisdictions differ is in whether the trial
court must make a finding of the defendant's ability to pay before
imposing the obligation to repay either recoupment or contribu-
tion fees, or whether the court need only consider the defendant's
financial circumstances when enforcement of the judgment is
sought. The Oregon statute at issue in Fuller required the court to
make a pre-imposition determination of ability to pay and to con-
sider the issue again if the defendant moved for remission or if the
state sought to revoke probation for failure to pay.94 The pre-
imposition determination of ability to pay was essential to the
Court's rejection of the constitutional challenges: "Oregon's legis-
lation is tailored to impose an obligation only upon those with a
foreseeable ability to meet it, and to enforce that obligation only
against those who actually become able to meet it without hard-
ship."95
Requiring a pre-imposition determination of ability to pay pre-
vents the guarantee of counsel at public expense for indigents
from becoming no more than the guarantee of a loan of counsel
94. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 45 (1974).
95. Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
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fees at statutory interest rates.96 The automatic imposition of the
repayment obligation on those who will never be able to repay
does not serve a legitimate state interest, and demoralizes defen-
dants .97
The obligation alone, which usually is reduced to judgment, will
have a real impact on defendants, even if it is never formally en-
forced. It will impair their credit, which may affect their ability to
find housing and employment. In a number of jurisdictions, the
convicted person cannot have his or her civil rights restored until
all financial obligations arising from the conviction have been
paid. The imposition of legal fees can thus become a barrier to re-
gaining the right to vote and other civil rights. 98 When this burden
is imposed with no finding of ability to pay, destitute defendants
suffer significant hardship.
Of course, "ability to pay" is a loose term, and is widely inter-
preted. The pre-imposition "ability to pay" may refer only to a
present ability to pay9 or it may encompass the court's predictions
about the defendant's job prospects, even prospects projected after
a period of incarceration."'00 Many jurisdictions refer vaguely to pre-
sent or future ability to pay,1°l some presume that anyone
96. In some jurisdictions, interest will continue to accrue during any incarceration pe-
riod. Interest can be substantial. In Washington, for example, the statutory interest rate is
12%. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.010 (2007). In one case, a defendant ordered to pay total
costs of $1610 owed $1,895.69 after making regular payments for five years, due to the ac-
crual of interest. Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 762 (Wash. 2007). In a Ninth Circuit case, a
defendant had served his time and paid $1,360 toward his financial obligations, but still
owed the original judgment amount of $7,269.11 due to accumulating interest. United
States v. Louck, 149 F.3d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir. 1998).
Judgment interest rates in other states vary, but rates over 10% are not uncommon. See
Richard A. Leiter, 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS, INTEREST RATES (2007) (attached table)
available on Westlaw (on file with the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGANJOURNAL OF LAW REFORM).
97. SeeJames v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 139 (1972).
98. See Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 763 (Wash. 2007) (upholding statute that re-
quires all financial obligations in the sentence to be paid before voting rights can be
reinstated).
99. United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 252 n.8 (3d Cir. 1998) (construing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(c), (f) (2006)).
100. See State v. Mitchell, 617 P.2d 298, 301 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding recoup-
ment order against defendant sentenced to twenty years in prison where finding of ability to
pay based on fact that defendant was "able-bodied and has demonstrated an ability to make
sufficient earnings.").
101. E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-12-25 (2007) ("is or will be able to pay"); ARIz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 11-584 (C) (2007) ("court shall take into account the financial resources of the de-
fendant"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 21-1-106 (2007) ("is able to repay all or part"); IND. CODE
§ 35-33-7-6 (2007) ("is able to pay part"); Mo. REv. STAT. § 600.090 (2007) (contribution if
no "substantial hardship," reimbursement if "becomes financially able to meet all or some
part"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-113(3) (2007) ("is or will be able to pay"); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 604-A:9 (2007) ("consistent with the defendant's present or future ability to pay");
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:24-12 (2007) ("has or reasonably expects to have means to meet some
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sentenced to prison does not have the ability to pay, °2 and at least
one jurisdiction restricts the court to assessing ability to pay for the
six months following conviction.103 When a defendant has been
sentenced to prison, a "finding" of ability to pay is more a guess
than a factual finding. The requirement of a pre-imposition find-
ing of ability to pay becomes almost meaningless if courts are
permitted to make such speculative predictions. But despite the
wide range in interpretation of ability to pay, the chance that the
obligation will fall on the truly indigent is lessened where there is
at least some factual determination before the obligation is im-
posed.
In a number of states, the recoupment statute specifically re-
quires that the trial court make a finding of ability to pay beforeimpoing c vl o criinal . . 104
imposing a civil or criminal obligation. The federal statute, 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(f), requires a pre-imposition finding that "funds
are available for payment," and has been interpreted to require a
finding of present ability to pay.105
part, though not all, of the costs"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 120.05 (2007) ("has, or may
reasonably be expected to have, the means to meet some part of the cost"); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 151.505 (2007) ("is or may be able to pay"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-40-10 (2007)
("funds are available"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-202(e) (2007) ("able to defray a portion
or all of the cost").
102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 98 7 .8(g) (2007). According to the 1986 Spangenberg report,
jurisdictions that require a pre-imposition determination of ability to pay do not impose
recoupment on incarcerated defendants in practice. SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at
36.
103. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987 .8(g) (2007).
104. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 132 P.3d 934, 938 (Kan. 2006) (holding court must
make finding as to ability to pay before ordering reimbursement of $745 in attorney's fees).
No such findings are necessary, however, with regard to the $100 application fee. State v.
Hawkins, 176 P.3d 174 (Kan. 2008); see also State v. Taylor, 166 P.3d 118, 124 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2007); People v. Amor, 523 P.2d 1173 (Cal. 1974); People v. Villa-Villa, 983 P.2d 181, 183
(Colo. App. 1999); State v. Wilson, 40 P.2d 129 (Idaho 2001); People v. Love, 687 N.E.2d 32
(Ill. 1997); Banks v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1050, 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Johnson,
2006 WL 751348, No. L-04-1221 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929 (Utah
1991); State v. Haught, 371 S.E.2d 54, 59 (W. Va. 1988); State v. Campbell, 718 N.W.2d 649,
667-68 (Wis. 2006); State v. King, 780 P.2d 943, 957 (Wyo. 1989).
In other states, statutes appear to require a pre-imposition finding of ability to pay. See
ALA. CODE § 15-12-25 (2007); CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8(g) (2) (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-
12-51 (court may order repayment as a condition of probation if it does not pose a financial
hardship); Mo. REv. STAT. § 600.090 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-113(3) (2007); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:9 (2007); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2B:24-12 (2007); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 120.05 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 151.505 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-40-10 (2007);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-202(e) (2007); W. VA. CODE § 29-21-16(g) (2007); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 7-6-106 (2008). Of course, the state courts could interpret such statutory language
differently.
105. United States v. McGiffen, 267 F.3d 581, 589 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ev-
ans, 155 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Fraza, 106 F.3d 1050 (1st Cir. 1997);
United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Bracewell,
569 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978). "Such a finding must be based on the defendant's current
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Courts in other jurisdictions, relying on Fuller,0 6 have recognized
that a pre-imposition finding of ability to pay is required by the
Constitution. The Vermont Supreme Court, for example, held
that the Sixth Amendment requires such a pre-imposition find-
ing, and reversed a trial court's order that the indigent defendant
repay $513 in defense attorney costs within 60 days of sentenc-
ing.'°7 Minnesota's highest court found that its statute requiring
"co-payments" ranging from $50 to $200 from every public de-
fense recipient was unconstitutional because it did not allow for
judicial waiver, either before imposition or at enforcement. t A
Pennsylvania court found the constitutional requirement of a pre-
imposition finding of indigency had been routinely violated in
one of its counties) °9 The court noted that the trial court's hostil-
ity toward indigent defendants could well chill the exercise of
Sixth Amendment rights.1
A federal court in Oregon actually held the state's post-Fuller re-
coupment statute unconstitutional as it no longer contained the
safeguards found in the Fuller statute, including a pre-imposition
determination of the defendant's ability to repay."' The court fur-
ther noted that, in actual practice, many counties required
applicants for public defense to sign a form that included a prom-
ise to repay attorney's fees and costs, unconstitutionally chilling the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.12 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals struck down a Kansas recoupment statute that
provided for the automatic imposition of judgment in the amount
of attorney's fees if not repaid within 60 days of receiving notice
from the judicial administrator. The court noted that under Fuller
and James v. Strange,"
3
a court should not order a convicted person to pay these ex-
penses unless he is able to pay them or will be able to pay
assets, not on his ability to fund payment from future earnings." United States v. Danielson,
325 F.3d 1054, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003).
106. 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
107. State v. Morgan, 789 A.2d 928, 931 (Vt. 2001).
108. State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 410 (Minn. 2004); see also State v.Jolicoeur, 742
A.2d 636 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1999) (holding trial court violated right to counsel by
refusing to consider indigency application unless defendant paid $50 application fee).
109. Commonwealth v. Opara, 362 A.2d 305 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). The court also held
that there was no statutory authority for recoupment of defense counsel fees. But see Com-
monwealth v. Hernandez, 917 A.2d 332 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (holding that, under Ful/er,
trial court need not make a pre-imposition finding of ability to pay before imposing costs).
110. Opara, 362 A.2d at 311.
111. Fitch v. Belshaw, 581 F. Supp. 273, 276 (D. Or. 1984).
112. Id. at 276-77.
113. 407 U.S. 128 (1972)
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them in the future considering his financial resources and the
nature of the burden that payment will impose. If a person is
unlikely to be able to pay, no requirement to pay is to be im-
posed.
4
The statute's failure to require a finding of ability to pay was one of
several reasons the court invalidated the statute."'
In contrast, a significant number ofjurisdictions have done away
with a pre-imposition determination of ability to pay altogether,
finding Bearden's restrictions on incarceration for non-payment to
be sufficient protection for indigents. In these jurisdictions, the
obligation to repay may be imposed on an indigent even if he or
she has no prospects of being able to make payments. These juris-
dictions erroneously believe that the Constitution is satisfied so
long as the court does not order foreclosure, garnishment, or in-
carceration without finding that non-payment was willful and not
simply the result of poverty.
For example, the Alaska Supreme Court found no Sixth
Amendment or Equal Protection violation where an Alaska statute
authorized the entry of a civil judgment for appointed counsel fees
without a hearing or inquiry into the defendant's ability to pay,
unless the defendant objected."6 A NewJersey statute that allowed
the public defender to file a lien against the defendant's property
for the value of services was also upheld against a challenge based
on the failure to require a finding of ability to pay before the lien
could be filed. The court found that it was enough that the defen-
dant could object if the lien were enforced."7 A Florida court ruled
similarly with respect to a lien for attorneys fees,"8 as did a Pennsyl-
vania court with respect to the imposition of costs and fees." 9 In a
decision recently upheld by the Kansas high court, an appellate
court held that the trial court had no obligation to sua sponte ad-
dress the defendant's ability to pay a $100 application fee. °
In several states, courts allow imposition of the obligation to re-
pay as a condition of probation or parole, without a finding of
ability to pay. These courts reason that the defendant is sufficiently
protected if inability to pay can be raised at a revocation hearing.
114. Olson v.James, 603 F.2d 150, 155 (10th Cir. 1979).
115. Id.
116. State v. Albert, 899 P.2d 103, 112 (Alaska 1995).
117. Stroinski v. Public Defender, 338 A.2d 202, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
118. Watrous v. State, 696 So. 2d 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). The Florida court held
that the trial court need not find an ability to pay, but must give the defendant the opportu-
nity to challenge the amount of the lien.
119. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 917 A.2d 332 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
120. State v. Hawkins, 152 P.3d 85 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007), afrid, 176 P.3d 174 (Kan. 2008).
[VOL. 42:2
Penalizing Poverty
Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the imposition of
recoupment as a condition of probation without a hearing or de-
termination of ability to pay. The court "cured" any constitutional
problem "by requiring the court to find that a probationer is capa-
ble, but unwilling, to repay the costs of his defense before
permitting a revocation of probation."' A Texas appellate court
used similar reasoning to uphold its recoupment scheme, noting
that the inability to pay was an affirmative defense to probation
revocation.2  The Florida Supreme Court has also held that no
finding of ability to pay is required prior to ordering recoupment
as part of a criminal sentence: "It is only when the state seeks to
enforce the collection of costs that a court must determine if the
defendant has the ability to pay."'
23
A Washington court went so far as to hold that a defendant's ob-
jection that he had no ability to pay the reimbursement was not
"ripe" until, and unless, the state sought to enforce the judg-
ment. 24 In Washington, fees for appointed counsel on appeal
automatically become part of the judgment and sentence against
the defendant if the defendant does not object to the state's cost
bill.' 25 Even if the defendant objects, no pre-imposition determina-
tion of ability to pay is required: "common sense dictates that a
determination of ability to pay and an inquiry into defendant's fi-
nances is not required before a recoupment order may be entered
against an indigent defendant as it is nearly impossible to predict
ability to pay over a period of 10 years or longer., 126 The Washing-
ton court's reasoning seems to turn Fuller on its head. The Fuller
majority relied on the fact that an obligation would not be imposed
on anyone who did not have the ability to pay; the Washington
court seems concerned that the obligation not escape anyone who
might someday be able to pay.
121. State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465, 473 (N.D. 1982).
122. Basaldua v. State, 558 S.W.2d 2, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). The current Texas stat-
ute retains this affirmative defense provision. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 21 (c)
(2007).
123. State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139, 142 (Fla. 1991).
124. State v. Hargrove, Nos. 23433-9-111, 23434-7-IIl, 2006 WL 564177 (Wash. Ct. App.
Mar. 9, 2006) (citing State v. Baldwin, 818 P.2d 1116 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)). The defendant
in Hargrove was sentenced to 660 months in prison and restitution over $110,000. It was
unlikely that the state would ever seek to enforce the judgment of $800 for attorney's fees.
Nevertheless, such a holding seems to fly in the face of Fullers reliance on the defendant's
ability to petition for remission at any time under the Oregon statute, as well as the language
of Washington Revised Code § 10.73.160(4) (allowing defendant to petition court for remis-
sion at any time).
125. State v. Blank, 930 P.2d 1213 (Wash. 1997).
126. Id. at 1220.
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Even more states have statutes that appear to allow imposition of
the obligation to repay fees without a pre-imposition determina-
tion of ability to pay, but their courts have not yet addressed
constitutional challenges to these provisions. 712 Indeed, the practice
of dispensing with a pre-imposition determination is probably
more widespread and not necessarily reflected in statutes or case-
law. For example, in 1986, judges in Oregon and Virginia routinely
ordered recoupment, regardless of the defendant's financial situa-
128tion. Wisconsin regulations require that the defendant be
informed of the obligation to repay and of the right to seek a de-
termination of ability to pay at appointment of counsel, but no
such determination will be made without a request.1 29 If defense
counsel has a conflict of interest with respect to recoupment, ob-
jections are unlikely.50
Application fees and other forms of contribution raise interest-
ing aspects of the ability to pay issue. With at least one exception, '
these fees may be waived. Presumably, such waivers would be based
on the defendant's financial circumstances, but generally no find-
ing of ability to pay is required before assessing the fees.'
Moreover, when the fees are neither waived nor paid, they may be-
come part of the defendant's sentence, a condition of probation,
or the subject of another order. Contribution debt may thus be
imposed without an express finding of ability to pay having ever
been made.
Finally, there are at least two states with statutes that permit the
court to order the defendant to "work off' the cost of counsel if the
defendant is unable to pay. In Delaware, for example, if a defen-
dant fails or is unable to pay the $50 administrative fee, the court
"shall" order the defendant to report to the Department of Correc-
tions for work to "discharge the fine."' In Massachusetts, the court
may order fifteen hours of community service in lieu of the $150
counsel fee.3 In other states, defendants may be ordered to work
127. E.g., IOWA CODE § 815.9 (2007); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 11
(2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.4:1 (2007). Actual practice is not necessarily reflected in
statutes or case law.
128. SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 34; see also Levine, supra note 2, at 210-13
(describing how some trial judges would not consider the defendant's resources when im-
posing recoupment, and noting the attorney's conflict of interest in contesting such
practices).
129. Wis. ADMIN. CODE. [PD] § 6.015 (2007).
130. See infra Part IV.
131. FLA. STAT. § 27.52(l)(b) (2007);Wright& Logan, supranote 2, at 2053.
132. Contribution may have been seen-erroneously-by many jurisdictions as a way
around the Fuller requirements for recoupment.
133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4607 (2007).
134. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21 1D, § 2 1/2(g) (West 2005).
[VOL. 42:2
Penalizing Poverty
off the cost of counsel if such fees are subject to the court's general
authority to order community service in lieu of payment of fines,
restitution and costs. l 5 The practice of ordering community service
in lieu of payment may exist even where there is no express statu-
tory authority.136 Other states have considered such "work off'
schemes, but found that such schemes raise constitutional ques-
tions about involuntary servitude for debt under the Thirteenth
Amendment.
137
B. Not AllJurisdictions Provide Notice and a Hearing Before Ordering
Recoupment or Contribution
The provision of notice and a hearing before ordering recoup-
ment or contribution is related to the pre-imposition determination
of a defendant's ability to pay. Jurisdictions that do not require the
latter generally do not require a hearing, although they may allow
the defendant to request a hearing or to object to the order.
Courts do not always recognize that there are at least two issues
that could be contested at a hearing: the defendant's ability to pay
as well as the amount of fees sought.
The Court did not address a due process challenge to the Ore-
gon recoupment statute in Fuller, but notice and hearing are
implicit in the various factual findings required by the Oregon
statute under review in that case. In addition, even entry of a civil
judgment for recoupment requires compliance with procedural
due process, which at the very least means notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard.'38 Similarly, notice and opportunity to be heard
135. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 910.2 (2007).
136. See Reid v. State, 481 S.E.2d 259 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (ordering community service
in lieu of payment of cost of defense counsel).
137. See Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 144, 151 (N.H. 1981). The court held that
proposed legislation requiring defendant who could not pay recoupment to work off debt
would violate the Thirteenth Amendment because the recoupment debt is a civil debt, not
part of the punishment for the crime. But the court went on to hold that because probation
wras a privilege, such uncompensated labor could be ordered as a condition of probation to
pay off the counsel fees. See also Informal Opinion No. 89-44, N.Y. Op. Att'y. Gen. 126
(1989), 1989 WL 435042 (Aug. 07, 1989) ("A court may not impose additional community
service on an indigent defendant to repay a county for the cost of providing counsel.").
138. Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 466 (2000) (finding due process viola-
tion when defendant received neither notice nor the opportunity to be heard before
judgment was amended to make him personally liable for attorney's fees). "The fundamen-
tal requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." Grannis v. Ordean, 234
U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
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are part of the minimal due process accorded a defendant facing
probation or parole revocation. °
A number of courts have required notice and hearing, based on
statute or court rule, prior to imposition of the order to repay.40
These statutory requirements are undoubtedly based on the consti-
tutional requirements of due process and fundamental fairness.
Other courts have invalidated statutes or procedures that do not
give the defendant notice of the recoupment or the opportunity to
contest the repayment order. A Pennsylvania appellate court re-
versed a recoupment order, in part, because the matter was raised
by the trial court without notice and the trial court would not con-
sider defendant's evidence of indigency14' Due process was also
found to be violated when public defense applicants were required
to sign a promise to repay the full costs of counsel, without a hear-
ing to contest the amount or ability to pay. In striking down a
post-Fuller recoupment statute in Kansas, the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals noted, "A further deficiency is its lack of proceedings
which would determine the financial conditions of the accused and
perhaps test the excessiveness of the attorney's fee (and these fees
are not modest).""' The sentencing hearing may provide adequate
process, as long as the defendant has notice that recoupment will
be considered and can contest the order. 
44
However, at least four courts have held that no notice or hearing
is required prior to entry of a recoupment obligation, either civil
or criminal. A New Jersey court upheld a statute that allowed the
public defender to file a lien for services without a hearing.145 The
Washington Supreme Court upheld a statute that required the
court to add the costs of counsel on appeal to the judgment and
sentence based on the state's cost bill. 6 The cost bill provided no-
tice, but there was no provision for a hearing unless, and until, the
state sought to enforce the judgment. Similarly, the North Dakota
139. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (requiring minimal due process for
probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (requiring minimal due
process for parole revocation).
140. See, e.g., People v. Poindexter, 258 Cal. Rptr. 680, 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (revers-
ing order where defendant had no notice that court would reconsider issue of ability to
pay); Williams v. State, 700 So. 2d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); People v. Bramlett, 455
N.E.2d 1092, 1094 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
141. Commonwealth v. Opara, 362 A.2d 305, 310 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
142. Fitch v. Belshaw, 581 F. Supp. 273, 277 (D. Or. 1984).
143. Olson v.James, 603 F.2d 150, 155 (10th Cir. 1979).
144. State v. Webb, 591 S.E.2d 505, 513 (N.C. 2004).
145. Stroinski v. Office of Pub. Defender, 338 A.2d 202 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
The court also held that defendants were not misled when told at arraignment that counsel
would be provided without cost. Id. at 211.
146. State v. Blank, 930 P.2d 1213 (Wash. 1997).
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Supreme Court found its state's recoupment statute did not violate
due process because a hearing would be required before probation
could be revoked.147 These courts reasoned that the notice and
hearing required to execute a judgment or to revoke probation is
sufficient, even though such notice comes long after the judgment
has been entered. These courts seem to conflate the due process
required to enforce a judgment with the due process required to
enter a judgment. They also fail to consider how difficult it will be
at the time of enforcement for the defendant to contest how the
fee was calculated. Enforcement may occur years after entry of the
judgment and, at that point, the attorney may be long gone and
records may be lost.
A Georgia court simply concluded that notice and hearing were
unnecessary because the defense attorney discussed his fee at sen-
tencing, and the trial court had information about the defendant's
financial status in his application for appointed counsel.4 8 This
court failed to see that the purpose of notice and hearing is to give
a defendant the opportunity to consider the issue and develop
relevant evidence. Moreover, the defendant cannot be expected to
contest, on the spot, his attorney's assertion about the amount of
fees.
In addition to the issue of notice of recoupment proceedings,
recoupment raises the question of whether defendants should be
given notice of possible recoupment debt prior to accepting ap-
pointed counsel. While some states require notice of potential
liability, such notice does not appear to be a uniform requirement,
nor one whose absence will invalidate a recoupment order. Some
statutes explicitly require that defendants be given notice of possi-
ble recoupment debt prior to accepting appointed counsel.49 But
in other jurisdictions, courts have held that such notice is not re-
quired, and that failure to provide notice of possible recoupment
debt is not unconstitutional' 0
147. State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465 (N.D. 1982).
148. Miller v. State, 472 S.E.2d 697, 701 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
149. SeeAALAsKA R. CRIM. P. 39(b)(2) (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8(f) (2007); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-4504(c) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:9(1I) (2008). The notice
mandated in these provisions is limited. While these statutes require notice of potential
recoupment, they do not specify how the fees will be calculated.
150. See, e.g., People v. Bramlett, 455 N.E.2d 1092, 1094 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); State v.
Haines, 360 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1985); State v. Dudley, 737 N.W.2d 325 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007)
(holding statute provides sufficient notice of possible recoupment obligation); State v.
Blank, 930 P.2d 1213, 1221 (Wash. 1997); see also Stroinski v. Office of Public Defender, 338
A.2d 202, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (holding that defendants were not misled
when told at arraignment that counsel would be provided without cost).
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Notice of possible recoupment debt can be double-edged. De-
fendants' awareness of their potential liability for fees might
contribute to the chilling effect of recoupment and cause more
defendants to attempt to go pro se. On the other hand, it is unfair
not to warn defendants that their "free" lawyer is not free, 15 ' and it
violates basic rules of professional conduct. In any other context, a
client is entitled "before or within a reasonable time of com-
mencement of the representation" to a clear statement of the
attorney's scope of representation, and the basis or rate of fee and
expenses."' In no other type of legal representation is it deemed
proper for the client to learn only at the conclusion of representa-
tion that the client must pay for the legal services, and on what
terms.
C. The Amount of the Obligation May Exceed the Actual Cost of Defense
Calculation of recoupment or contribution can also determine
whether the obligation is another aspect of punishment, or
whether it is carefully computed to be no more than the actual cost
of defense. In too many instances, the amount appears arbitrary.
The amount of recoupment may be based on the actual bill of
defense counsel or it may be taken from a schedule of fees set by
the legislature or other authority.53 Recoupment based on the ac-
tual hourly bill is arguably fairer to individual defendants, 54 but
requires more administrative effort.15 ' A simpler method is to
charge a flat fee for certain types of cases, which may vary with the
type of proceedings involved.156 These fees may reflect the actual
cost to the government where the public defense contract is based
on a flat fee per case.
However, flat fee amounts may or may not be fair to the majority
of indigent defendants. If the contract fee is an effort to approxi-
151. See Cummings v. Polk, 475 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2007) (rejecting habeas petition
where petitioner claimed Miranda warnings were flawed because the interviewing officer
added that petitioner might have to reimburse legal fees if found guilty).
152. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2008).
153. SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 37-39.
154. But hourly fees can add up to enormous amounts. One of the most astonishing re-
coupment stories is told in a Louisiana case where the defendant was ordered to pay
attorneys' fees and defense costs in the amount of $127,905.45 after having been tried 4
times and having served 44 years in prison--some on death row. He was ultimately convicted
of manslaughter, and the recoupment order was reversed for lack of statutory authority.
State v. Rideau, 943 So. 2d 559 (La. CL App. 2006).
155. SeeSPANGENBERG ETAL., supra note 11, at 37-39.
156. Id. For example, there may be a flat fee for felonies that go to trial, and a lower fee
for felonies that are disposed of without a trial.
[VOL. 42:2
Penalizing Poverty
mate the average cost per case, then any defendant whose case re-
quires less time than average is paying to subsidize more complex
cases. 5 7 For example, a Florida court reversed a recoupment order
of $4,200, based on a flat fee of $600 per case, where seven cases
had been brought against the defendant. The appellate court
noted that
by accepting the $600 per case contract billing, the trial court
did not consider the value of services provided by appellant's
appointed attorney. Appellant pled no contest and agreed to
the sentences imposed. The value of his attorney's services for
negotiating the plea agreement on the combined cases may
have been considerably less than the amount awarded.
5
1
The range of effort put into a class of cases may vary substantially: a
guilty plea may be entered after twenty minutes discussion, or after
weeks of investigation, consultation and negotiation; a trial may
take a few hours or several weeks. Such schedule fees could well
run afoul of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibition
against unreasonable fees.159 On the other hand, an effort to re-
coup for hours actually spent would also be unreasonable if it
resulted in a bill larger than the flat fee paid by the government
under a flat fee contract.
A few decisions have reversed recoupment orders where the fee
was deemed arbitrary or unsupported. 60 In most cases, however,
the amount is not challenged. As one court pointed out, "within
limits it was [defense counsel] who would determine the amount
157. See State v. Albert, 899 P.2d 103, 125-26 (Alaska 1995) (Bryner, J., dissenting).
Judge Bryner's dissent contains an extended discussion of why flat fee schedules can be
unfair to defendants.
158. Dees v. State, 692 So. 2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
159. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2008). Similarly, a flat fee may
exceed the actual cost of representation to the state. For example, a Texas statute provides
that recoupment should be "for compensation paid to appointed counsel for defending him
in the case, if counsel was appointed, or if he was represented by a county-paid public de-
fender, in an amount that would have been paid to an appointed attorney had the county
not had a public defender." TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 11 (11) (2007). If the
appointment fee exceeds the cost to the state of staffing the public defender office for this
representation, arguably the defendant represented by a public defender would be over-
charged.
160. See Fitch v. Belshaw, 581 F. Supp. 273, 278 (D. Or. 1984) ("summary assessments");
People v. Poindexter, 210 Cal. Ct. App. 3d 803, 810-11 (1989) (requiring evidence of actual
costs to support recoupment order of $600); Commonwealth v. Opara, 362 A.2d 305, 312
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) ("There is no indication in the record that the basis for the lower
court's decision as to the amount to be reimbursed was anything but arbitrary."); People v.
Hayes, 521 N.E.2d 168, 170 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (noting that hourly rate in support of trial
court order exceeded that in guidelines applicable to other counties); Dees v. State, 692 So.
2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (see infra text accompanying note 164).
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of the attorney fees."' 6' Where defense counsel presents the re-
coupment bill, he or she will not object to the amount. For this
reason, it is troubling when courts hold any objections to recoup-
ment or the recoupment process are waived by trial counsel's
inaction.162 These courts do not see the inherent conflict in hold-
ing trial counsel responsible for objecting to his or her own fees.1
3
It is probably because of this conflict that recoupment issues are
not raised more widely.'
6 4
Even fees collected as contribution, through "application fees"
or "co-pays," could result in overpayment for services. Such fees are
usually based on a schedule and, according to a 2001 study, range
from $10 to $200.16 '5 A law student recounted how she had a case
dismissed prior to trial and was shocked when the trial court im-
posed the Massachusetts "counsel fee" of $150.166 On a smaller
scale, in one Minnesota case the attorney spent one-half hour on
representation, and her hourly rate was $40. The trial court or-
dered the defendant to pay the application fee of $28 in addition
to $20 recoupment. The appellate court ordered the recoupment
order stricken, holding that the application fee must be credited
toward recoupment.'6 7 The court did not seem to notice that the
defendant had still overpaid by $8.00.
161. State v. Stock, 643 P.2d 877, 877 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
162. United States v. Gurtunca, 836 F.2d 283, 288 (7th Cir. 1987) (defendant "did not
object to the reimbursement order or request an express finding ... [nor] assert in the
district court on appeal that he is unable to pay the fees."); People v. Whisenand, 37 Cal.
App. 4th 1383, 1395 (1995) ("Counsel did not object to the order, and did not claim sur-
prise or lack of notice."); People v. Nash, 539 N.E.2d 822, 828 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); State v.
Bass, 280 S.E.2d 7, 11 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
163. A more realistic view is reflected in the following: "Although the defendant's at-
torney did not request a hearing, he had no reason or incentive to do so; within limits it was
he who would determine the amount of the attorney fees." State v. Stock, 643 P.2d 877, 877
(Or. Ct. App. 1982).
164. But see Wright & Logan, supra note 2. The authors observe that public defense ad-
ministrators and leaders often favor contribution as a budgetary tool, while ground-level
defenders in large defender organizations identify with their clients and oppose such meas-
ures. These observations ring true, but seem inapplicable to appointed counsel or defenders
who are not employees of a large defender organization, and who may benefit directly from
recoupment or contribution.
Of course, where recoupment is paid to a branch of government other than the public
defender, and according to a fee schedule rather than counsel's bill, there is less likelihood
of a conflict of interest. See infra Part VI.
165. DOWLING, supra note 11, at2.
166. Levine, supra note 2. The student believed that a competent lawyer could have ob-
tained the same result with twenty minutes of work. The student did not say whether she or
her employer was paid for her services. It is quite likely that she was an unpaid intern or
that, if she was paid, it was at a very low rate.
167. State v. Cunningham, 663 N.W.2d 7, 13 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). The Minnesota co-
payment statute was held unconstitutional one year later in State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403
(Minn. 2004). The amended statute at issue in Tennin required co-payments of $50 to $200.
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As one judge noted with respect to fee schedules, there seems to
be an assumption that most "application fees" or co-pays are be-
nevolent because they are much less than what it would cost to hire
a private attorney.' s The correct basis for comparison, however, is
to the actual cost of the public defender, not to private counsel
fees. 69 The government's cost of providing a defender will almost
always be less than what it would cost a defendant to hire a private
attorney. Regardless of private attorney rates, if schedule fees ex-
ceed the government's actual cost, defendants are overpaying.
Recoupment based on a fee schedule and contribution based on
set "application fees" are cost efficient, but only because they cir-
cumvent calculations of actual cost. Unless such schedules are
limited to trivial amounts, or modified in individual cases to reflect
lower actual costs, there is a risk that defendants will be over-
charged. Even fees at the very low end of the range can result in
overpayment for those who plead quickly.
The desire for efficiency should not trump the requirements of
due process, and yet that is precisely what has been allowed to
happen in a number ofjurisdictions.
D. Some Jurisdictions Justify Recoupment and Contribution as Serving the
Goals of Punishment
Punishment can be understood as "the imposition of hard
treatment" as part of the "blaming" for an offense.170 While an all-
purpose definition of punishment is difficult, and beyond the
scope of this article, 17' there is a rich literature on the four classical
168. See State v. Albert, 899 P.2d 103, 125-26 (Alaska 1995) (Bryner,J., dissenting).
169. Id.
170. Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Civil-Criminal
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 806 (1997). This article discusses some of the debate and
difficulty in agreeing on a definition of punishment. See Celia Rumann, Tortured History:
Finding Our Way Back to the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 661 (2004) (arguing that for
Eighth Amendment purposes punishment should not be confined to post-conviction penal-
ties).
171. In the context of particular legal issues, for example, punishment is defined in
various ways. For example, in evaluating statutory challenges based on the Ex Post Facto
Clause, the Court will not find a scheme punishment where the stated legislative purpose is
civil unless the clearest proof contradicts that stated intent or shows a punitive effect. Smith
v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (rejecting Ex Post Facto challenge to Alaska Sex Offender
Registration Act); see also Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (discussing a similar
standard for evaluating whether a sanction constitutes criminal punishment for double
jeopardy purposes). These various definitions pertain to the purposes of these constitutional
provisions. The point of this section of this article is not to show that recoupment or contri-
bution meets any particular definition of punishment, but only to demonstrate that punitive
justifications sometimes creep into recoupment and contribution cases.
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justifications of punishment: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation
and incapacitation. 172 james v. Strang 73 and Fuller v. Oregon174 did not
justify recoupment as punishment, but only recognized the state's
interest in recovering the costs of public defense from those de-
fendants who can afford it. 7 5 In fact, the Strange court decried the
"elements of punitiveness" apparent in the Kansas statute."6 Since
these decisions, some courts have stated clearly that recoupment is
not punitive, but merely cost collection. However, others rely ex-
pressly on punitive justifications.
17
Some courts have recognized explicitly that recoupment is not
part of the punishment. The Virginia Supreme Court found that,
as an item of costs assessed against a convicted defendant, attor-
ney's fees are "no part of the sentence of the court, and
constitute[] no part of the penalty or punishment prescribed for
the offense .... The right to enforce payment is a mere ... inci-
dent to the conviction .... 17 Similarly, a Georgia appellate court
stated that recoupment "is not required as part of the punishment
philosophy but rather to restore to government coffers some of the
expense incurred for the one whose behavior is responsible for
it."'' 79 The New Hampshire Supreme Court also noted that repay-
ment of the cost of legal counsel is not part of the punishment for
the crime, and concluded, therefore, that requiring some defen-
dants to "work off' the debt through public service would violate
the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servi-
tude.'
172. "A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence,
retribution, or rehabilitation." Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (citing 1 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5 (1986) (explaining theo-
ries of punishment)). These are the purposes of punishment reflected in federal sentencing
law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006); see also Albin Eser, The Nature and Rationale of Punishment, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 2427 (2007).
173. 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
174. 417U.S. 40 (1974).
175. See supra Part III.
176. Strange, 407 U.S. at 142.
177. Of course, the classical purposes of punishment can also be used at times in service
of civil remedies. Steiker, supra note 170. Punitive damages, for example, and civil remedies
in general, rely on a deterrence model to some extent. "All civil penalties have some deter-
rent effect." Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102 (1997).
178. Wicks v. City of Charlottesville, 208 S.E.2d 752, 756 (Va. 1974) (quoting Common-
wealth v. McCue, 63 S.E. 1066, 1067 (Va. 1909)).
179. Miller v. State, 472 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); see also State v. Robinson,
132 P.3d 934, 939 (Kan. 2006) (noting recoupment was not intended to be punitive).
180. Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 144, 150-51 (N.H. 1981). The court was com-
menting on proposed amendments to the recoupment law. The court also noted, however,
that because probation is a privilege rather than a right, the sentencing court could properly
condition probation upon the indigent defendant working off the attorney's fees. Id. at 151-
52. The court's two conclusions-that requiring the defendant to work off the debt violates
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Federal circuits are split as to whether recoupment can be made
a condition of supervised release or probation, and the reasoning
turns on whether recoupment is seen as part of the punishment for
the crime. All circuits acknowledge that recoupment is authorized
by 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f), but they disagree as to whether it may be a
condition of probation or supervised release. Federal statute re-
quires that conditions of probation or supervised release be
"reasonably related" to the "nature and circumstances of the of-
fense" and serve certain purposes: to promote deterrence, to
protect the public from future crimes, and to provide the defen-
dant with training or treatment.181 As already noted, these purposes
are the classic purposes of punishment: retribution, general deter-
rence, specific deterrence, and rehabilitation. 18 2 In addition, the
probation condition should involve "no greater deprivation of lib-
erty than is reasonably necessary."
183
Several circuits have found that recoupment is not a proper
condition of probation or supervised release. 184 The Third Circuit
court held that the profitable nature of an offense was not enough
to render it "reasonably related" to recoupment, and that "repay-
ment of counsel fees incurred in defending a prosecution would
not likely deter crime, protect the public, or serve any rehabilita-
tive function."'' s The Ninth Circuit stated:
The repayment of fees bears no reasonable connection to the
need for a sentence to 'reflect the seriousness of the offense'
because the repayment is simply not punitive in nature. Re-
quiring defendants who can do so to pay for the costs of their
defense is an elementary part of the way the criminal justice
system operates in this nation. The government bears the cost
only when the defendant is unable to do so. The purpose of
requiring repayment when it turns out that the defendant has
the necessary funds available is to implement that basic prin-
ciple .... It follows from what we have said that an order to
the Thirteenth Amendment, but not if such a requirement is a condition of probation-
seem contradictory. The court's opinion may not have had the benefit of advocacy, however,
as it is an advisory opinion about possible legislation. Id. at 146-47.
181. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d), 3563(b), 3553(a) (2006).
182. See supra note 172.
183. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 248-49 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing 18
U.S.C. §§ 3583(d), 3553(a)); United States v. Eyler, 67 F.3d 1386, 1393-94 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Lorenzini, 71 F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding similarly with respect
to probation); United States v. Turner, 628 F.2d 461, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1980) (reaching a
similar conclusion, but under pre-guidelines sentencing statutes).
185. Evans, 155 F.3d at 250.
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repay attorney's fees is also not reasonably related to the goal
of 'provid[ing] just punishment' for the offense. '
The court went on to point out other, less drastic, measures avail-
able to the government to collect the debt.'87
On the other hand, the First Circuit allows recoupment as a
condition of probation or supervised release because it finds that
repayment of counsel costs does serve the statutory punitive pur-
poses. The First Circuit noted that, as with any financial sanction,
an order to pay is a deterrent to crime and therefore will protect
the public from additional crimes by the defendant. '88 "That mone-
tary payments deter crime is the notion that underlines the
elaborate code of fines reflected in the Federal Criminal Code and
the Sentencing Guidelines."'" The court thus justified the use of
recoupment as part of the punishment for the offense.
Several states have also explicitly used the rationales of punish-
ment to justify recoupment. The Iowa Supreme Court upheld its
recoupment statute, noting, "The purpose of the legislation goes
beyond revenue recovery; it is designed to instill responsibility in
criminal offenders .... [Recoupment is based on] rehabilitation of
the criminal defendant."' 90 An Ohio court upheld recoupment as a
condition of probation for similar reasons. It held that recoupment
promotes acceptance of responsibility and that the experience of
economic independence will enhance the probationer's self-
esteem and thereby promote rehabilitation. 9' The North Dakota
Supreme Court similarly concluded that recoupment would fur-
ther rehabilitation, enhance deterrence, and be an incentive for
employment.'9'
The Fuller decision opened the door to treating recoupment as
punishment when it approved recoupment as a condition of pro-
bation and as part of the criminal sentence.' 93 Once recoupment
became part of the criminal proceedings, rather than a civil obliga-
tion, it was inevitable that the line between this essentially civil debt
and other financial penalties would blur. Procedures for the collec-
tion of fines are applied to recoupment as it is lumped in with
186. Lorenzini, 71 F. 3d at 1493.
187. Id.
188. United States v. Merric, 166 F.3d 406, 410 (lst Cir. 1999).
189. Id. The Seventh Circuit has also allowed recoupment as a condition of probation,
but for reasons unrelated to the purposes of punishment. See United States v. Gurtunca, 836
F.2d 283, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1987). The decision dealt with pre-guidelines sentencing.
190. State v. Haines, 360 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Iowa 1985).
191. State v. McLean, 622 N.E.2d 402, 405 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
192. State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465, 474 (N.D. 1982).
193. See417 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1974).
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other penalties arising from conviction. The language of punish-
ment used by some courts in addressing recoupment and
contribution illustrates how easy it is for courts to view the obliga-
tion as a penalty when it is imposed as part of the sentence.
V. RECOUPMENT AND CONTRIBUTION WITHOUT THE SAFEGUARDS OF
Fuller ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Although Fuller may have opened the door for punitive recoup-
ment, a close reading of that case suggests the constitutional limits
of a recoupment or contribution program. The preceding section
shows that a significant number of jurisdictions do not observe
those limits. For purposes of challenging the programs in such ju-
risdictions, it should be enough to show that they are in violation
of the limitations in Fuller.194 But it is also possible to show, as Fuller
implied, that when jurisdictions disregard those limits, indigent
defendants are penalized for exercising their Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, the right to counsel is chilled, and the Due Proc-
ess and Equal Protection Clauses are violated. 195 The essence of the
problem is procedural: recoupment is unconstitutional where
there is no finding of ability to pay, fee awards are not supported,
or there is no notice and opportunity to be heard on these issues.
When these procedural safeguards are absent, recoupment debts
will be imposed on the truly destitute, and will often be in excessive
amounts.
194. See, e.g., State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 407-08 (Minn. 2004) (invalidating Min-
nesota co-pay statute because it did not contain the judicial waiver provisions of the statute
reviewed in Fuller).
195. There are a number of potential arguments based on independent state constitu-
tional grounds, too. States may interpret parallel state provisions to provide greater
protection to defendants than do their federal counterparts. See Stewart F. Hancock, The
State Constitution, A Criminal Lawryer's First Line of Defense, 57 ALB. L. REv. 271 (1993). The
North Carolina Supreme Court found that a statute imposing appointment of counsel fees
on defendants "regardless of the outcome" of the case violated that state's constitutional
prohibition against imposing "costs" against defendants not found guilty. State v. Webb, 591
S.E.2d 505, 508 (N.C. 2004). In addition, many states have constitutional provisions against
imprisonment for debt. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 20; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 17; ARIZ.
CONST. art. II, § 18; CAL. CONST. art I, § 10; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 12; FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 11; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1 para. XXIII; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 19; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 14;
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 19; OR. CONST. art I, § 19, cited in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 48 n.9
(1974).
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A. Penalty on the Exercise of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has struck down stat-
utes that penalize the exercise of a constitutional right. A seminal
case in criminal law, United States v. Jackson,9g invalidated the Fed-
eral Kidnapping Act because it only allowed imposition of the
death penalty if the defendant had a jury trial. The Court stated,
"The inevitable effect ... is, of course, to discourage assertion of
the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exer-
cise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial."' 97 The
Court found this to be an "impermissible burden" on the exercise
of the right to jury trial, although it acknowledged that not every
burden on a constitutional right would be unconstitutional.'"
The Court in Fuller held that the Oregon recoupment statute
did not penalize the exercise of a constitutional right because
"Oregon's recoupment statute merely provides that a convicted
person who later becomes able to pay for his counsel may be re-
quired to do so."''99 The Court did not see Oregon's recoupment
scheme as punishment and thus only gave the penalty argument a
passing glance.2 0 0 But when jurisdictions do not observe the limits
196. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
197. Id. at 581 (footnote omitted).
198. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 24-25 (1973) (finding no unconstitu-
tional burden on right to appeal where even if defendant prevailed on appeal, defendant
might receive harsher sentence from jury on retrial). The Court distinguished North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), in which it found a constitutional violation where a harsher
sentence was imposed on retrial for clearly vindictive reasons.
For other examples of unconstitutional penalties on the exercise of a constitutional right,
see Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 283-84 (1968)
(employees could not be fired for asserting their Fifth Amendment rights not to incriminate
themselves); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (state could not deny welfare
benefits to recent immigrants who had exercised their right to travel between states). The
Shapiro Court held that moving within the United States is "a constitutional right, and any
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary
to promote a compellinggovernmental interest, is unconstitutional." 394 U.S. at 634.
But see Daniel Giveber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility and its Con-
sequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1363 (2000) (arguing that Jackson is no longer good law in
light of sentencing guidelines that penalize defendants for exercising their right to go to
trial).
199. 417 U.S. 40, 54 (1974).
200. The Court distinguished its precedents where statutory provisions were found un-
constitutional, stating that in those cases "the provisions 'had no other purpose or effect
than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise
them.'" Id. (citing United States v.Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)). This quotation from
Jackson is a little disingenuous: the full quote is, "If the provision had no other purpose or
effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to
exercise them, then it would be patently unconstitutional." 390 U.S. at 581. The Court in
Jackson ultimately held the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act unconsti-
tutional even though penalizing a constitutional right was not its sole-or indeed at all an
intended-purpose. See id. at 582-85. The Court in Fuller also distinguished two other cases:
emphasized in Fuller, recoupment can become punishment for
poverty and for the exercise of a constitutional right.
Jurisdictions that do not require a pre-imposition determination
of ability to pay can impose repayment obligations on all indigents,
including the destitute, on the grounds that ability to pay is only
relevant at enforcement.2 1 It is then up to the defendant to bring a
challenge to the obligation, yet some courts will not hear such
challenges unless, and until, the state seeks to enforce the judg-
ment or to revoke probation for non-payment.02° The obligation
itself, even if it is not formally enforced, has significant impact on
the defendant's ability to obtain credit, employment or housing.03
When this burden falls on indigents who have no ability to repay, it
is excessive and therefore penalizes the right to counsel.
Similarly, when jurisdictions impose the repayment obligation
without notice or a hearing to determine ability to pay and the ap-
propriate amount, the obligation may be imposed on those who
are unable to pay and the amount may be excessive even for those
able to pay. Defendants will have no opportunity to contest the
amount, and there will be no assurance of factual support for the
bill. Any resulting overcharge is obviously a penalty on the right to
counsel.2 4
B. A "Chill" on the Exercise of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Fuller held that the Oregon statute under review did not chill the
exercise of the right to counsel because it merely provided that an
indigent who became capable of repayment could be ordered to
repay.0 5 But when jurisdictions authorize imposition of the obliga-
tion without any determination of ability to pay, and when they do
so without notice or hearing to dispute the amount and ability to
pay, the potential chilling effect becomes substantially greater and
therefore unconstitutional.
Uniforned Sanitation Men Ass'n, 392 U.S. 280, and Gardner v. Broderick, 393 U.S. 273 (1968),
which held that city employees could not be dismissed for refusing to waive their Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. SeeFuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 54 (1974).
201. See supra notes 117-126 and accompanying text.
202. See Stroinski v. Office of Public Defender, 338 A.2d 202, 211 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1975);
State v. Blank, 930 P.2d 1213, 1221 (Wash. 1997). Both cases are discussed supra at notes
145-146.
203. See infra notes 263-270 and accompanying text.
204. These penalties for exercising the right to counsel are amplified when excessive or
unjustified recoupment is ordered as a condition of probation, parole, or supervised release.
Now the threat of incarceration is added.
205. SeeFuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53 (1974).
359WINTER 2009] Penalizing Poverty
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
As the Fuller majority noted, there is no reason that indigents
should be completely protected from the financial considerations
that affect non-indigents charged with a crime .20  But at some
point, the threat of an impossible debt-one the indigent can
never hope to repay-is likely to cause indigents to waive counsel.
The chill is a matter of degree. The fact that the Fuller court found
no unconstitutional chill from the narrowly tailored Oregon stat-
ute at issue in that case does not mean that no recoupment statute
will cause an unconstitutional chill.0 7 This was the reasoning of the
Pennsylvania court when it struck down a reimbursement order:
The possibility of being subjected at the close of trial to an ar-
bitrary determination as to ability to pay for the services of
appointed counsel, without any of the protections afforded by
a hearing comporting with due process, may lead persons
truly indigent and therefore eligible for free counsel to
choose to forego counsel initially. While it is true that the Su-
preme Court in Fuller ... rejected the 'chill' rationale ... it
did so in the context of a case in which it was dealing with a
reimbursement statute 'carefully designed to insure that only
those who actually become capable of repaying the State will
ever be obliged to do so.'
20°
Most of the discussion about chilling effects is speculative, based
on anecdotal evidence about the likely behavior of rational actors.
There is a dearth of empirical evidence about the actual effects of
different recoupment and contribution schemes on waiver rates. 0
Imposition and enforcement of recoupment can vary substantially,
even within states, so that generalization is difficult.2 10 Nevertheless,
as the Jackson court noted, it is not necessary that every defendant
subject to the penalty be unconstitutionally affected. "[T]he ques-
206. See id. at 53-54.
207. See Wilson, supra note 40, at 19 (noting that the "chill" argument is much more
"compelling" when flat contribution fees are imposed on all defendants without a determi-
nation of ability to pay).
208. Commonwealth v. Opara, 362 A.2d 305, 312-13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (citations
omitted); see also Fitch v. Belshaw, 581 F. Supp. 273, 277 (D. Or. 1984).
209. See Wright & Logan, supra note 2, at 2076-85 (discussing some limited evidence
about fee waiver rates following the introduction of contribution schemes and concluding
that waiver rates are highly influenced by the "trial actors":judges and defense attorneys).
210. Trial judges may have very different approaches to granting waivers of fees, and
court personnel or other persons charged with collection may approach their task with vary-
ing levels of determination. See Levine, supra note 2, at 212-13 (noting that judges at one




tion is whether that [chilling] effect is unnecessary and therefore
excessive. ,
2 11
Recoupment schemes that do not include a pre-imposition de-
termination of ability to pay, notice, and an opportunity to be
heard not only have a greater chilling effect on indigents, because
of the inevitable debt and the defendant's lack of control over the
debt amount, but this chilling effect is entirely unnecessary as the
state has no legitimate interest in imposing a possibly excessive
debt on those who can never hope to repay.
C. Recoupment Violates Equal Protection and Due Process
Punitive recoupment violates not only the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, but also the Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Arguments un-
der these clauses are closely related. This section examines
recoupment under the blended due process and equal protection
test often applied to challenges based on poverty, and also looks at
separate procedural due process and equal protection analyses.
1. The Blended Equal Protection and Due Process Test
The Supreme Court has developed a blended due process and
equal protection approach to cases involving poverty and access to
the courts.21 2 " 'The equal protection concern relates to the legiti-
macy of fencing out would-be appellants based solely on their
inability to pay core costs,' while '[t] he due process concern homes
211. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968). The dearth of empirical evi-
dence about waiver and actual chilling effect is the result of state and municipal record-
keeping failures, yet some courts lay failure at the feet of defendants, holding that they have
"failed" to establish a chilling effect. See State v. Albert, 899 P.2d 103, 130-31 (Alaska 1995)
(BrynerJ., dissenting). Obviously, no defendant who faces a recoupment order has waived
counsel, and thus no such defendant has personally been sufficiently "chilled" in the exer-
cise of the right to counsel. Arguably, the chill argument is more properly made in another
context by a defendant who has refused counsel. See Fuller, 417 U.S. at 61 (Marshall,J., dis-
senting) (suggesting that the chill argument might be better raised by a defendant
challenging a waiver of counsel as not voluntary).
212. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983); see also Smith v. Robbins, 528
U.S. 259, 276 (2000) (noting that Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses converge to
require "adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants"). The Court has
retained a "blended" equal protection and due process analysis of issues involving indigents
and access to the courts. See also Sundeep Kothari, Comment, And Justice for All: The Role
Equal Protection and Due Process Principles Have Played in Providing Indigents With Meaningful
Access to the Courts, 72 TUL. L. REv. 2159, 2200-02 (1998).
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in on the essential fairness of the state-ordered proceedings.' ,2 1 3
Alaskan Judge Bryner, in dissent, applied this blended test to the
recoupment law at issue in State v. Albert
Given the fundamental nature of the right to counsel and the
liberty interest implicated by the needless discouragement of
the exercise of the right to counsel, a constitutional challenge
to a recoupment plan essentially calls into question the basic
fairness of the challenged provision. In this situation, regard-
less of whether the challenge asserts a violation of equal
protection or a direct violation of the right to counsel, "the is-
sue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole
analysis, but rather requires a careful inquir, into such factors
as the 'nature of the individual interest affected, the rational-
ity of the connection between legislative means and purpose,
[and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the
purpose[.]' ""14
Recoupment without the Fuller safeguards fails this fairness test.
First, multiple individual interests are affected, including the fun-
damental right to counsel, the defendant's financial interests, and,
if payment is a condition of probation, the defendant's liberty in-
terest. The extent to which those interests can be affected is great:
the defendant's right to counsel may be chilled; the financial obli-
gation may be small or large but it will not necessarily be
affordable; and probation revocation, parole revocation, or revoca-
tion of suspended sentence can result in significant incarceration.
Second, the rationality of the connection between legislative means
and purpose is strained. The legislature's only legitimate purpose is
to replenish its coffers from those who benefited from assigned
counsel and who can afford to repay. To impose repayment on
even those who cannot repay does not serve this purpose, and may
even be a waste of resources. Most evidence shows that recoupment
programs are not cost-effective and revocation of probation for
failure to pay only adds the state expense of incarceration. Finally,
alternative means for effectuating the legislative purpose exist, but
they admittedly may be politically unpopular.15
213. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610-11 (2005) (quoting M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519
U.S. 102, 120 (1996)).
214. State v. Albert, 899 P.2d 103, 122-23 (Alaska 1995) (BrynerJ., dissenting) (quot-
ing Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666).
215. For example, states could impose higher taxes on all citizens or those who use the
courts. States could also tighten indigency requirements and screening, to prevent assign-
ment of counsel to those who are not truly indigent.
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The fairness test used by Judge Bryner is drawn from a line of
cases addressing financial barriers to appellate review that begins
with Griffin v. Illinois.2 6 In Griffin, the Court held that a state may
not require an indigent defendant to pay for the trial transcript as
a condition of appealing a conviction. In subsequent decisions, the
Court extended the Griffin holding to misdemeanor appeals2 17 and
to habeas proceedings.219 In addition, the Supreme Court held that
state courts may not condition an indigent's appeal upon a finding
that the appeal is not frivolous. 9 In M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,22 the Court
struck down state statutes that required an indigent parent appeal-
ing the termination of her parental rights to pay record
preparation fees in advance, emphasizing the convergence of due
process and equal protection principles.22' More recently, the Court
used this fairness approach to hold that a defendant was entitled to
appointed counsel in an appeal from the denial of a motion to
withdraw a plea of nolo contendere . Using the same blended
test, however, the Court also held that states need not provide
counsel to indigents for discretionary appeals from state convic-
221tions.
It is not clear that the issue of punitive recoupment falls under
this line of cases, even though the blended fairness test can address
most of the problems with recoupment and contribution pro-
grams. Unlike the practices addressed in Griffin and most of its
progeny, recoupment is not a barrier to appellate review, but
rather a consequence of being poor and accepting a public de-
fender. Moreover, the essence of the problem with many
recoupment and contribution programs is procedural: the consti-
tutionality of recoupment depends on a pre-imposition finding of
ability to pay and the opportunity to contest the order. If proce-
dures ensure that the defendant can pay, and the amount is
reasonable, the right to counsel is not violated. 22' Thus, an analysis
that emphasizes due process seems appropriate: "The due process
216. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
217. See, e.g., Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 198 (1971).
218. See, e.g., Long v. Dist. Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 194-95 (1966); see also Smith v.
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713-14 (1961) (holding that the filing fee for state habeas corpus
application must be waived for indigent convicted prisoners).
219. SeeDraper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499-500 (1963).
220. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
221. Seeid. at 120-21.
222. See Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005) (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.
600, 610-12 (1974)).
223. Ross, 417 U.S. at 600.
224. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
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concern homes in on the essential fairness of the state-ordered
proceedings anterior to adverse state action."2 5
2. Procedural Due Process
Where jurisdictions do not require a pre-imposition determina-
tion of ability to pay, or notice and opportunity to be heard before
the debt is imposed, basic due process is violated. At a minimum,
due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before
an obligation is imposed.26 As Judge Bryner wrote, dissenting from
the court's rejection of a challenge to Alaska's process for imposing
a civil recoupment debt:
In no other area of Alaska law that I am aware of is a private
or public debtor virtually stripped of the right to a trial-or
even the right to a hearing-and subjected upon ten days' no-
tice to the automatic entry of a final civil judgment-all
without even the courtesy of a request or demand for pay-
ment .... Moreover, in no other area of Alaska law does a
recipient of state-provided professional services become
automatically liable to pay a charge based on an inflexible
schedule of arguably arbitrary predetermined fees, without
regard to the professional services actually rendered in the
specific case.2
Without any determination of ability to pay, or an opportunity to
challenge the amount of the fees, recoupment orders become arbi-
trary-the antithesis of due process.
The purpose of procedural due process is to protect persons
from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty or
property.28 The risk of erroneous or unjustified recoupment orders
is great when the safeguards of the statute in Fuller are not present.
In fact, it is fair to say that erroneous or unjustified orders are cer-
tain to occur when there is no pre-imposition determination of
ability to pay and no notice or hearing on the issues of ability to
pay and the amount of fees. As a class, indigent criminal defen-
dants who qualified for public defense are likely still indigent at
the conclusion of representation. Thus, recoupment orders im-
225. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120.
226. See supra Part III.
227. State v. Albert, 899 P.2d 103, 124 (Alaska 1995) (Bryner,J., dissenting).




posed without a determination of ability to pay will certainly fall on
many who cannot pay without substantial hardship. Morever, where
there is no notice or opportunity to contest the fee amount, exces-
sive awards are bound to occur.
3. Equal Protection
It is unclear whether a separate argument based only on the
Equal Protection Clause adds anything to a constitutional chal-
lenge based on poverty and the right to counsel. 9 Such an
argument is unlikely to receive heightened scrutiny because eco-
230nomic status is not a suspect class for equal protection purposes,
although the right to counsel is a fundamental right.3 1 Lower
courts have not applied strict scrutiny to any recoupment chal-
lenges based on the Equal Protection clause or the Due Process
clause. Instead, following the lead of Fuller, they have used a ra-
tional basis analysis. 32
Nevertheless, it is worth looking carefully at the equal protection
problems with recoupment. The Fuller court addressed two equal
protection arguments: one based on the distinction between de-
fendants who were convicted and those who were acquitted, and
one based on James v. Strange and the distinction between protec-
tions offered defendants under the recoupment statute and those
offered other judgment debtors. 3 These holdings provide limited
support for additional arguments. The Fuller Court's conclusion
that a distinction between acquitted and convicted defendants is
non-invidious seems sound, but that does not mean recoupment
laws must make such distinctions.34 James v. Strange continues to
229. SeeWAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 482-89 (2d ed. 1999).
230. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) ("[W]here
wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or pre-
cisely equal advantages."); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (stating that the
Court "has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for equal protec-
tion purposes").
231. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).
232. See, e.g., State v. Haines, 360 N.W.2d 791, 794-95 (Iowa 1985) (rejecting equal pro-
tection challenge to state recoupment statute, applying what appears to be rational basis
scrutiny); State v. Ellis, 167 P.3d 896, 900-01 (Mont. 2007) (rejecting challenge to recoup-
ment under both state and federal equal protection clauses); State v. Haas, 927 A.2d 1209,
1210 (N.H. 2007) (reasoning that recoupment does not affect a fundamental right for sub-
stantive due process purposes).
233. See supra Part III.
234. If the state's interest in recoupment is cost recovery rather than punishment, re-
coupment could logically apply to the acquitted and convicted alike. See Haas, 927 A.2d 1209
(rejecting equal protection challenge to recoupment statute that applied to acquitted and
convicted defendants).
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support equal protection challenges where recoupment is a civil
debt with fewer protections than other civil debts, but has little im-
pact where recoupment is made a criminal penalty.
23'
At least one additional equal protection argument seems to have
some merit, based on the dissent in Fuller. Justice Marshall pointed
out:
The important fact which the majority ignores is that under
Oregon law, the repayment of the indigent defendant's debt
to the State can be made a condition of his probation, as it
was in this case. Petitioner's failure to pay his debt can result
in his being sent to prison. In this respect the indigent defen-
dant in Oregon, like the indigent defendant in James v.
Strange, is treated quite differently from other civil judgment
debtors.
.... [T]he nonindigent defendant in a criminal case in Ore-
gon who does not pay his privately retained counsel, even
after he obtains the means to do so, cannot be imprisoned for
such failure. The lawyer in that instance must enforce his
judgment through the normal routes available to a creditor-
by attachment, lien, garnishment, or the like. Petitioner, on
the other hand, faces five years behind bars if he fails to pay
his 'debt' arising out of the appointment of counsel.236
Justice Marshall's argument is thus that equal protection is vio-
lated when an indigent, partially indigent, or even formerly
indigent defendant is threatened with imprisonment for non-
payment, while a non-indigent who refuses to pay retained counsel
can never be sent to prison for failure to pay the civil debt. The
majority's response seems to be that there is no equal protection
problem as long as imprisonment only results from a willful failure
to pay, not from poverty. Yet the fact remains that a defendant with
a recoupment order as a condition of probation always remains
under a threat of imprisonment, and may have to defend against
allegations of willful non-payment. These are "unduly harsh or dis-
criminatory terms, 237 that do not apply to a defendant who owes a
debt to a private attorney.238
235. See supra note 232 and cases cited therein.
236. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 60 (1974) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 61 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
238. Strangely, some courts have used the very procedures of probation and revocation
or suspended sentence to reject equal protection challenges to recoupment as a condition
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Justice Marshall's equal protection argument is especially strong
when applied to recoupment schemes that do not observe the
safeguards of the statute at issue in Fuller, namely pre-imposition
determination of ability to pay, notice, and the opportunity to be
heard. As already noted, schemes that do not provide these safe-
guards do not even pass a rational basis test since the state has no
legitimate or rational interest in penalizing indigents who have no
prospect of being able to pay for an attorney, and it has no legiti-
mate interest in imposing excessive or unfounded fee debts. Where
debts are imposed without these safeguards and then made a con-
dition of probation or suspended sentence, the disparity in
treatment of the civil debtor and the consumer of public defense
becomes stark and unjustifiable.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS ARE EXACERBATED BY LEGAL
REPRESENTATION THAT VIOLATES PROFESSIONAL ETHICS RULES
The preceding section demonstrates that recoupment and con-
tribution are punitive and violate the Constitution when not
accompanied by the safeguards required by a close reading of
Fuller. Common ethical problems may also contribute to the consti-
tutional violations. Recoupment and contribution can compromise
the attorney-client relationship by creating a conflict of interest
and interfering with the defendant's right to counsel of choice.
Attorney fee rules are violated when defendants do not know at the
beginning of the representation that they will be responsible for
the fees and what those fees will be. In any other context, it would
be clear that these practices do not meet professional standards.
Even if these defects do not violate the constitution, they result in
representation that falls below the requirements of professional
codes, and may well contribute to some of the problems already
noted.2 9
A. Conflicts of Interest
Conflicts of interest can arise because of the role that defense at-
torneys must often play in recoupment. In some jurisdictions,
of probation. See, e.g., State v. Haines, 360 N.W.2d 791, 794-95 (Iowa 1985); State v. Ellis,
167 P.3d 896,900 (Mont. 2007).
239. But see Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Commission, 501 F.3d 592 (6th
Cir. 2007) (Public Defender may be civilly liable for not requesting indigency hearings in
probation revocation for failure to pay fines).
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attorneys are responsible both for submitting the bill to the court
and objecting to it on behalf of their clients. They may be the
direct beneficiaries of the payment and yet they are expected to
argue their client's inability to pay. All lawyers have a potentially
adversarial position with their clients when it comes to their fees,
but in no other context are lawyers expected to help secure court
orders against their clients in the same proceedings where they
represent those clients.
240
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from
representing a client "if the representation may be materially lim-
ited ... by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer
reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely af-
fected; and (2) the client consents after consultation., 241 Most
appointed counsel who submit fee statements to the court for re-
coupment probably do not recognize any conflict, believing that
they are simply complying with court rules or statute.242 In fact,
there are many instances where attorneys have acted against their
own or their employer's self-interest and argued against recoup-
ment. For the most part, these are public defenders employed by
larger agencies-defenders who have a sense of "mission" on be-
half of the indigent that may conflict with the economic interests
of their employers.243 On the whole, however, it is unrealistic to ex-
pect defense attorneys to always put their client's interests before
their own.244 The rules of professional conduct are built on the as-
sumption that clients must be protected from the risk of harm in
245such situations.
Yet, where recoupment is incorporated into the criminal pro-
ceeding, rather than imposed as a separate civil obligation, defense
attorneys frequently labor under this conflict. They represent the
240. If a private lawyer decides to seek an attorney's fees lien or sue a client for unpaid
fees, the lawyer's representation of the client ends. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.7 cmt. 8 (2007).
241. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2007). Most states have a similar
provision.
242. Conflicts with one's self-interest are the most difficult to recognize. Helen A.
Anderson, Legal Doubletalk and the Concern with Positional Conflicts: A "Foolish Consistency".', 111
PENN ST. L. Rov. 1, 33 (2006).
243. Wright & Logan, supra note 2, at 2055-60 (discussing the schism between the lead-
ership of defense groups, who tended to favor contribution proposals, and the courtroom
defenders, who opposed them).
244. See Levine, supra note 2, at 210 (discussing the conflict of interest that inhibits Mas-
sachusetts public defenders from challenging the lack of due process in the imposition of
attorneys' fees).
245. This assumption is well-founded. SeeJacqueline McMurtrie, Unconscionable Contract-
ing For Indigent Defense: Using Contract Theoy to Invalidate Conflict of Interest Clauses in Fixed-Fee
Contracts, 39 U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM 773 (2006); Gideon s Broken Promise, supra note 22, at iv.
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defendant as the court imposes recoupment, and are held respon-
sible for raising objections to the amount imposed, any lack of due
process, or the defendant's ability to pay. 46 Where defense counsel
or their employers benefit directly from the recoupment order, it is
difficult to see a way around this conflict. Defendants could be
given elaborate disclosures and asked to waive the conflict, but this
kind of conflict is probably not waivable.247 Where defense counsel
is responsible for submitting the bill, counsel has an unavoidable
conflict with respect to challenging the amount of recoupment.
Defendants could be assigned "conflict counsel," solely for the
purpose of post-conviction proceedings to impose recoupment,
but such a program would be prohibitively expensive. Only where
defense counsel has nothing to do with setting the amount of the
fee and where counsel does not stand to benefit from the recoup-
ment order can a conflict of interest be avoided.
Contribution programs, too, can lead to conflicts of interest, es-
pecially if administered by public defender agencies. "Defenders
face the temptation of using the fee to control a burdensome
caseload by stressing the costs of representation to defendants al-
ready sitting on the fence [considering a waiver of counsel].
Where fees become an important part of the indigent defense
budget, counsel will have an incentive not to challenge them.2 49
The conflict of interest can even extend through collection proce-
dures if the public defender is responsible for collection. Thus,
studies of recoupment and contribution have recommended that
collection not be carried out by a defender agency.2 50
Finally, some jurisdictions have required defense counsel to in-
form the court of any change in the defendant's indigent status.
The ethical basis for this requirement is tenuous, and can also pit
the attorney against the client.
25
1
246. See supra notes 161-164 and accompanying text.
247. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RR. 1.7 cmt. 10, 1.8 (2008).
248. Wright & Logan, supra note 2, at 2066. In addition, having to discuss fees and col-
lection at the start of the attorney-client relationship can damage the representation by
creating distrust. Id.
249. Id.; Levine, supra note 2, at 210 (reporting that public defender agency sought in-
crease in contribution amount to bolster public defense budget).
250. SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 71-72; DoWNING, supra note 11, at 28;
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ASSIGNED
COUNSEL SYSTEMS [hereinafter NLADA STANDARDS], Standard 2.4 (1989), http://
www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderStandards/GuidelinesForLegalDefense-Systems.
251. See Bradley C. Mayhew, Indigent Defendants and Reimbursement: Counsel's Duty to Re-
port Changes in Financial Conditions to the Tribunal, 18J. LEGAL. PROF. 281 (1993).
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B. Attorneys'Fees
Some of the due process problems with recoupment and contri-
bution could be avoided if courts complied with the professional
rules for attorney's fees. Model Rule 1.5 sets out the requirements
for fees, how to assess their reasonableness, and the client's right to
prior notice of the basis of the fee and expenses. The rule provides
in part: "The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of
the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall
be communicated, preferably in writing, before or within a reason-
able time after commencing the representation. 2 52 Imposing fees
at the conclusion of representation, with no prior warning of po-
tential liability, violates the Model Rules. Yet, as we have seen,
lack of notice to the defendant of potential liability is no bar to re-
coupment.
254
C. Right to Counsel of Choice
The Rules of Professional Conduct give the client the right to
hire and fire the attorney.255 This right is denied indigents who ac-
cept appointed counsel. Moreover, those who can afford to pay for
an attorney have a Sixth Amendment right to an attorney of their
choosing.56 Where that right is violated, for example through er-
roneous disqualification of counsel, the violation is so serious that
the defendant need not even show prejudice or the lack of harm-
less error on appeal from the conviction.2 57 However, where a
defendant is indigent, there is no right to demand a particular at-
torney. "The right to counsel of choice does not extend to
252. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2008).
253. Some might argue that where the basis for the fee is established by statute or other
rule, the defendant has constructive notice of the potential fee and how it will be calculated.
But such constructive notice does not seem to comply with the spirit of the Model Rules,
which stress disclosure and communication by the attorney. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.5 cmt. 2 (2008). "Generally, it is desirable to furnish the client with at least a
simple memorandum or copy of the lawyer's customary fee arrangements that states the
general nature of the legal services to be provided, the basis, rate or total amount of the fee,
and whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any costs, expenses, or
disbursements in the course of the representation. A written statement concerning the
terms of the engagement reduces the possibility of misunderstanding." Id.
254. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
255. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a) (3) (2008).
256. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006); see also Wayne D. Holly, Re-
thinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: Do Reimbursement Statutes
Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for the Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 181, 185
n.26 (1998).
257. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146-51.
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defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them."2 '8 A
criminal defendant may not "insist on representation by an attor-
ney he cannot afford.'1
59
But if defendants are held financially responsible for the cost of
appointed counsel, can the limitation on the constitutional or pro-
fessional code right to counsel of choice be maintained? A
defendant who complies with an order to repay the entire cost of
counsel will have paid for an attorney not of his or her choosing.
One response is that courts will have no way to know who is likely
to repay when ruling on requests for change of counsel, 6° and that
very few defendants actually pay off their recoupment debts in any
case. But, as the right to counsel at public expense evolves into a
loan rather than a gift, withholding the right to counsel of choice
appears more and more untenable. And what of a defendant who
pays a significant up-front contribution fee? Should that defendant
be entitled to at least a limited right to counsel of choice, or is that
right dependant on payment in full before trial?
2 61
Even if there is no constitutional violation in denying indigent
defendants a choice of lawyers, defendants may be resentful of hav-
ing to pay for an attorney who was foisted upon them. This
resentment could impede rehabilitation. Resentment could also
poison the attorney-client relationship where the recoupment ob-
ligation is imposed before trial, as with contribution. Defendants
will be especially bitter if they are aware that those who can afford
to hire a private attorney have not only a constitutional right to
choose their lawyer, but also the authority to hire and fire their at-
torney under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
22
VII. RECOUPMENT AND CONTRIBUTION ARE BAD POLICY
Recoupment and contribution are not good policy. As the pre-
ceding analysis shows, too often programs devolve into punishment
that violates the Constitution in a number of ways, and
258. Id. at 151; see also Holly, supra note 256, at 182 n.7.
259. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has gone so far as to find that indigent defendants do not even have the right to
choose an attorney willing to represent them pro bono. Miller v. Smith, 115 F.3d 1136 (4th
Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding no constitutional violation where Maryland provided free
trial transcript to indigent criminal appellants only where indigents were represented by the
state public defender, but not when represented by pro bono counsel).
260. Holly, supra note 256, at 221.
261. See id. (arguing that reimbursement laws bolster an already strong argument for
extending the right to counsel of choice to indigents).
262. SeeMODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2008).
WINTER 20091
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 42:2
recoupment may compromise legal representation by causing ethi-
cal violations. In addition, recoupment is rarely cost-effective, and
not worth the chilling effect on the right to counsel. Recoupment
adds to the already extraordinary financial burdens put upon those
convicted of crimes, weighing most heavily on precisely those de-
fendants who wish to turn away from a life of crime but having no
effect on hardened recidivists who have no intention of paying
their debts. Finally, recoupment and contribution do not serve any
of the legitimate goals of punishment.
Recoupment and contribution are just one more line item on a
growing list of defendant obligations creating a crushing financial
burden. The trend in recent years has been to charge those con-
victed of felonies for numerous consequences of conviction.
"Criminal justice agencies are increasingly fee-driven."2 4 In addi-
tion to the traditional fines and restitution, many jurisdictions
charge for the costs of incarceration, costs of probation, costs of
DNA testing, costs of electronic detention, costs of counseling,
costs of drug and alcohol testing, and impose special assessments
265for particular programs. These costs quickly add up, even for
relatively minor crimes.266 When the total obligation becomes un-
manageable, compliance is more difficult and offenders may lose
the motivation to "go straight.' '267 A recent study found that
"[f]inancial pressures and paycheck garnishment resulting from
263. McLEAN & THOMPSON, supra note 43; Kirsten D. Levingston & Vicki Turetsky, Debt-
ors' Prison-Prisoners' Accumulation of Debt as a Barrier to Reentry, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., July-
Aug. 2007, at 187; R. Barry Ruback & Mark H. Bergstrom, Economic Sanctions in Criminal
Justice: Purposes, Effects, and Implications, 33 CRIM.JUST. & BEHAV. 242 (2006).
264. McLEAN & THOMPSON, supra note 43, at 8. "[A]dministrative assessments on cita-
tions fund nearly all of the Administrative Office of the Court's budget in Nevada. In Texas,
probation fees made up 46 percent of the Travis County Probation Department's $18.3
million budget in 2006." Id.
265. Wendy Heller, Note, Poverty: The Most Challenging Condition of Prisoner Release, 13
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 219, 226-27 (2006); Adam Liptak, Debt to Society Is least of
Costs for Ex-Convicts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at Al.
266. For example, one case study of a New York defendant convicted of driving while
intoxicated showed total financial obligations of $8,795 that he would have to pay over five
years of probation, in addition to $26,000 worth of child support he would owe during that
period. McLFAN & THOMPSON, supra note 43, at 14.
267. See Barry R. Ruback et al., Perception and Payment of Economic Sanctions: A Survey of
Offenders, 70 FED. PROBATION 26 (2006) (researching reasons for widespread non-payment
of sanctions, the authors found that economic difficulty was a significant reason, along with
confusion about the purpose of the sanctions and a perception of unfairness). But see Olson
& Ramker, supra note 54, at 43 (finding in a study of Illinois probationers that an increase in
the total amount of fees and fines imposed increased the likelihood that the probationer
would make payments). The Olsen and Ramker study also found, however, that courts were
more likely to impose fees on those who were employed and likely to be able to pay. Id. at
33-34.
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unpaid debt can increase participation in the underground econ-
omy and discourage legitimate employment.
2
11
By definition, indigent defendants are among the poorest of so-
ciety. An arrest record, and especially a conviction, will make it
difficult to find work and move out of this economic bracket.
69
Most incarcerated people are parents of minor children who con-
tinue to accrue large child support obligations, and who leave
prison or jail with thousands of dollars of child support debt. 270 It
makes little sense to place an additional financial obstacle before
those trying to rehabilitate, when there are already other signifi-
cant debts, and when that additional obligation is so closely tied to
the exercise of a constitutional right.
There is also a strong argument that the criminal defense attor-
ney serves not only the defendant's interests, but also the state's
271interest in reliable and fair determinations of guilt or innocence .
Such reliability and fairness are essential to the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system. Given the defense attorney's important role
in ensuring this legitimacy, it makes sense for the state to continue
to bear the costs of defense for the indigent, just as it bears the
costs of the court system for rich and poor alike.
Finally, even if recoupment and contribution are seen as prop-
erly part of the punishment for the offense, they make poor
penalties because they do not serve any of the purposes of pun-
ishment: deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution or incapacitation 
7
1
Deterrence is served by recoupment only to the extent one be-
lieves that any monetary penalty is a deterrent to crime. 7 The
268. MCLEAN & THOMPSON, supra note 43, at 8.
269. Id. at 7.
270. Id. at 7, 25.
271. As one early and influential report put it:
It is not only the interests of accused persons that require attention be given to the
problems of poverty in criminal law administration. Other and broader social inter-
ests are involved. We believe that the problems considered in this report
[representation of the poor in criminal courts] concern no less than the proper func-
tioning of the rule of law in the criminal area and that therefore, the interests and
welfare of all citizens are in issue .... The proper performance of the defense func-
tion is thus as vital to the health of the system as the performance of the prosecuting
and adjudicatory functions.
Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Criminal
Justice, Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice 10 (1963) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
272. These are the four classic justifications for punishment. See Ewing v. California, 538
U.S. 11, 25 (2003); see alsol8 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006); Eser, supra note 172.
273. See United States v. Merric, 166 F.3d 406, 410 (1st Cir. 1999) ("That monetary
payments deter crime is the notion that underlines the elaborate code of fines reflected in
the Federal Criminal Code and the Sentencing Guidelines.").
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marginal deterrent value of recoupment, considering the other
costs, fines and assessments imposed on many criminal defendants,
is questionable. If recoupment deters anything, it deters accepting
an appointed lawyer-which only supports the argument that re-
coupment chills the exercise of Sixth Amendment rights.
Deterrence arguments, then, might prove too much by underscor-
ing how reluctant defendants may become to accept appointed
counsel in the future. Thus, the justification of deterrence is weak.
Rehabilitation is not served by recoupment, although it is a
commonly asserted justification.274 Some argue that indigent de-
fendants will learn responsibility, independence, and even gain
self-esteem through repayment.175 No empirical evidence supports
this assertion.2 76 It is more likely that a repayment obligation will
impede rehabilitation by adding to already overwhelming financial
obligations, which may include fines, restitution, costs, housing,
27and child support. In jurisdictions that allow interest to accrue
on the defendant's legal financial obligations, even dutiful defen-
dants may find it difficult to keep up with interest by making what
small payments they can afford. 78
Increasingly, states impose "user fees" on defendants. Prisoners
pay the cost of incarceration, probationers pay the cost of proba-
tion, sex offenders often pay the cost of mandated therapy.
2 79
Recoupment and contribution can be seen as part of the general
280trend toward privatization. It is difficult, however, to see how the
additional obligation of repaying the cost of an attorney, who was
not chosen and who did not prevail, will enhance rehabilitation. It
could just as well "embitter[] the probationer who views this use of
probation as extortion or threatened imprisonment for debt."28 1 A
large debt may remove the incentive to get ajob, rather than moti-
vate employment 282 and it may drive defendants into the
underground economy. Because the amount of fees has little to
274. See David A. Leen, Fuller v. Oregon: The Cost of a Constitutional Right, 55 OR. L. REv.
99, 114 & n.117 (1976).
275. See supra notes 190-192 and accompanying text.
276. Leen, supra note 274, at 114 & n.118.
277. Heller, supra note 265, at 223-31.
278. See, e.g., Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757 (Wash. 2007) (noting that one plaintiff in
this voting rights case paid $10 per month and was unable to keep up with the accruing
interest on her debt to the state).
279. Heller, supra note 265, at 227.
280. Wright & Logan, supra note 2, at 2051-52.
281. Yale Kamisar & Jesse H. Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Find-
ings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 26 (1963), quoted in Leen, supra note
274, at 114 n.118.
282. SeeJames v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 139 (1972).
283. McLEAN & THOMPSON, supra note 43, at 8.
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do with the crime and is not tied to the severity of the defendant's
conduct, but rather to the complexity of proceedings, the defen-
dant may not feel the fees are fair, which could also promote
embitterment.28 4 The rehabilitative justification thus is dubious.
Retribution is poorly served by recoupment because the amount
imposed bears no relation to the severity of the crime, but rather is
determined by the complexity of the case and the attorney's ef-
forts. The amount may also be driven by the prosecution: if the
prosecutor causes a mistrial, the defense fees go up. If the defen-
dant prevails on appeal and wins a new trial, the defense fees are
doubled. There is thus no proportionality-the hallmark of retri-
bution-between the crime and the amount of recoupment.
Finally, incapacitation, the fourth classic justification of punish-
ment, is not served at all by recoupment and contribution. The
obligation to pay attorney's fees does nothing to incapacitate the
defendant from committing additional crimes.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The American Bar Association (ABA) and the National Legal Aid
and Defender Association (NLADA) have taken positions against
recoupment in general, and specifically against recoupment as a
condition of probation or parole. Their recommendations are a
start, but the preceding sections of this article demonstrate the acute
need for additional guidelines.
A. The ABA and NLADA Positions
The ABA has taken a position against recoupment, "except on
the ground of fraud in obtaining the determination of eligibility.
2 85
However, it has approved contribution, defined as "payment at the
time counsel is provided or during the course of proceedings. 
2 86
The full black letter standard provides:
(a) Reimbursement of counsel or the organization or
the governmental unit providing counsel should
not be required, except on the ground of fraud in
obtaining the determination of eligibility.
284. Comments, Charging the Costs of Prosecution to the Defendant, 59 GEO. L. J. 991, 999-
1000 (1970).
285. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-7.2(a) (3d ed. 1992).
286. Id., cmt. at 91.
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(b) Persons required to contribute to the costs of coun-
sel should be informed, prior to an offer of counsel,
of the obligation to make contribution.
(C) Contribution should not be imposed unless satisfac-
tory procedural safeguards are provided.
Although the black letter standard clearly opposes reimburse-
ment, the comments set forth alternative procedural safeguards to
be used in recoupment programs if the primary recommendation
is not followed.a
The ABA's conditional approval of contribution was based on
the assumption that contribution was a less onerous alternative to
recoupment; an assumption that turned out to be unwarranted."81
In 2004, the ABA House of Delegates adopted "Guidelines on Con-
tribution Fees for Costs of Counsel in Criminal Cases," elaborating
on the "procedural safeguards" referred to in subsection (c) of the
black letter standard.2 190 The report that accompanied the guide-
lines noted the rise of public defender "application fees" that were
287. Id.
288. Id.
When recoupment is practiced, even though not recommended here, appropriate pro-
cedural safeguards should be created. The most significant of these safeguards, as gleaned
from the cases and statutes, are:
" the right to notice of the potential obligation;
" the right to an evidentiary hearing on the imposition of costs of coun-
sel, with an attorney present and with the opportunity to present
witnesses and to have a written record of the judicial findings;
* the right to a determination of present ability to pay actual costs of
counsel and related fees, such as investigative or clerical costs;
" the right to all civil judgment debtor protection;
" the right to petition for remission of fees, in the event of future inability
to pay;
" notice that failure to pay will not result in imprisonment, unless willful;
" notice of a limit, statutory or otherwise, on time for the recovery of fees;
" adequate information as to the actual costs of counsel, with the right
not to be assessed a fee in excess of those actual costs;
" where any of these rights are relinquished, the execution of a voluntary,
knowing and intelligent written waiver, as is required in any instance
concerning the constitutional right to counsel.
Id.
289. Wright & Logan, supra note 2, at 2064-65.
290. Am. BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES ON CONTRIBUTION FEES FOR COSTS OF COUNSEL IN
CRIMINAL CASES (Aug. 2004) (adopted by ABA House of Delegates as Recommendation No.
110), http://www.abanet.org/legalser%ces/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/recl IO.pdf.
The guidelines urge a pre-imposition determination of ability to pay, giving the defendant
the opportunity to present information and witnesses on the determination, that counsel
should not be responsible for collection, that the defendant should be able to petition for a
waiver, and that defendants should be given notice of the potential contribution obligation
prior to assignment of counsel.
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applied to all indigents, regardless of ability to pay, and stated that
the purpose of the new guidelines was to apply the safeguards of
21Fuller v. Oregon to contribution programs.
The NLADA issued guidelines in 1976 that approve of the de-
fendant making a "limited cash contribution" to the cost of
defense if it will not impose "a substantial financial hardship upon
himself or his dependents." 2 92 The NLADA also recommended a
pre-imposition determination of ability to pay any contribution,
and that payment not be made directly to counsel.9 Finally, the
NLADA recommended a formula to ensure that contribution is
limited:
[T]he contribution should not exceed the lesser of (1) ten
(10) percent of the total maximum amount which would be
payable for the representation in question under the assigned
counsel fee schedule, where such a schedule is used in the
particular jurisdiction, or (2) a sum equal to the fee generally
paid to an assigned counsel for one trial day in a comparable
294case.
Both the ABA and the NLADA take the position that non-
payment of contribution should never be a ground for
291. Id. at 3-7.
292. NAT'L STUDY COMM. ON DEF. SERVS., NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N,
GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, SUMMARY OF RECOMMEN-
DATIONS, Guideline 1.7 (1976) [hereinafter NLADA GUIDELINES], http://www.nlada.org/
Defender/Defender Standards/GuidelinesForLegalDefenseSystems.
293. NLADA STANDARDS, supra note 250, Standard 2.4 (1989), http://www.nlada.org/
Defender/DefenderStandards/Standards For TheAdministration Of AssignedCounsel:
(a) Persons eligible for representation by assigned counsel (Standard 2.3)
shall not be asked to contribute toward, nor to reimburse the jurisdic-
tion for, the cost of assigned counsel.
(b) Jurisdictions that do require payment by eligible persons of some por-
tion of the cost of assigned counsel shall establish a procedure for
determining the amount of contribution to be paid. This procedure
shall be implemented prior to or early in representation by assigned
counsel, and shall include a hearing on the ability of person to pay.
(c) Any payment by or on behalf of a person represented by assigned coun-
sel toward the cost of representation shall be made to a fund or
through a mechanism established for that purpose, and not directly to
assigned counsel. Assigned counsel shall not be responsible for collec-
tion of payment.
(d) Payment toward the costs of representation by assigned counsel shall
never be made a condition of probation or other sentence-related su-
pervision.
294. NLADA GUIDELINES, supra note 292, Guideline 1.7(b).
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incarceration. These organizations' policy statements are sup-
ported by the way in which recoupment and contribution have
operated during the last thirty years. This history also underscores
the need for some additional recommendations, in the event gov-
ernments do not accept the primary recommendation to do away
with recoupment.
B. Proposed Guidelines to Protect the Right to Counsel for Indigents
The following recommendations are based on the ABA and
NLADA positions, as well as recommendations in the 1986 Span-
genberg study,29 6 and the preceding study of caselaw and statutes
since Fuller.
First, recoupment should be abandoned. Defendants should not
be penalized for being poor and exercising a constitutional right.
Second, contribution should only be in nominal amounts that
defendants can pay at the time of assignment or shortly thereafter,
upon a judicial finding of financial ability. The defendant should
be clearly informed that, if indigent, contribution cannot be re-
quired as a condition of appointment of counsel. Contribution
should not become a loan or long-term obligation.29 7
Alternatively, if recoupment is not abandoned, it should be a
purely civil obligation. It should not be part of the criminal sen-
tence because it can too easily be lumped together with other
penalties and fees that attach to conviction. It should be enforced
just as any other civil obligation, and the defendant should never
be subject to incarceration for non-payment.
If contribution is imposed as a debt, then it must only be done
with all the procedural safeguards of recoupment. (See below.)
If recoupment is not abandoned, the following procedural safe-
guards should be observed:
* The defendant must be notified, at the time he or
she applies for counsel, of the potential recoup-
295. NLADA STANDARDS, supra note 250 (stating payment of contribution should never
be a condition of probation or other sentence-related provision); Am. BAR ASS'N, supra note
290, at 4 ("Failure to pay a contribution fee should not result in imprisonment or the denial
of counsel at any stage of proceedings.").
296. SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 70-73; NLADA STANDARDS, supra note 250;
CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 285, at 5-7.2(a).
297. Another possible reform would be to simply provide credit to the accused to -hire
counsel of choice on reasonable terms-a kind of guaranteed loan. Given the problems that
have arisen when private attorneys compete for public defense contracts, and the clear
benefits of professional public defense offices, such a policy seems unwise. See supra note 245
and sources cited therein.
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ment obligation as well as the proper procedure for
imposing the obligation. This notice should include
the basis on which the fee will be calculated.
* The defendant must be notified of the conflict of
interest with defense counsel on this issue if defense
counsel will be responsible for determining the
amount of the obligation or if defense counsel has a
financial interest in a recoupment order.
9 8
* The court imposing the obligation must make a
pre-imposition determination of ability to pay. The
defendant must be given notice and an opportunity
to be heard on the issue of ability to pay. The court
must have the authority to waive all or part of the
obligation.
* The defendant must be given notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard on the amount of the obligation.
Actual records of counsel's efforts and other de-
fense expenses must support any obligation
ordered.
* The defendant must be allowed to petition the
court at any time for remission of the obligation.
* Payment of recoupment should never be a condi-
tion of probation or parole.
IX. CONCLUSION
The idea that indigent criminals should have to pay for the costs
of their defense greatly appeals to many. After all, as the Fuller
court noted, non-indigents have to struggle with the high cost of
legal representation. Moreover, many people believe that it is the
wrongdoing of the convicted that creates the necessity for the ex-
pense in the first place. Even though defense counsel's presence
ensures the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, and thereby
protects all of us, many still ask: why should the community as a
whole bear this entire burden, a burden that makes up a large part
of the budget of struggling state and local governments?
The past thirty years have proven the appeal of recoupment to
be false. For the most part, constitutionally implemented contribu-
tion and recoupment programs are not cost-effective.
298. Such notice will not be enough to cure the conflict, but at least the defendant will
be informed and have the opportunity to object.
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Furthermore, there has been a tendency in many jurisdictions for
the programs to become punitive. Defendants are paying a penalty
for being poor and choosing to exercise their Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. Recoupment obligations are being imposed with-
out basic due process protections, and many defendants make
payments under threat of incarceration. Moreover, recoupment is
just one of a large number of financial obligations imposed upon a
group little able to bear those obligations.
The Supreme Court set the stage for this devolution into pun-
ishment when it approved the Oregon recoupment statute in Fuller
in 1974. Although the statute at issue there had a number of safe-
guards for defendants, it allowed recoupment to be made part of
the sentence and to be enforced as a condition of probation. As a
result, many jurisdictions treat recoupment more like a fine than
the recovery of what is essentially a civil obligation. The state's only
legitimate interest in recoupment is the recovery of the cost of
counsel from those who have the ability to pay. This interest does
not justify treating recoupment as a penalty, especially as it is a
penalty on the exercise of a constitutional right.
Ultimately, recoupment is bad policy. It does not bring in suffi-
cient revenue to justify the problems it creates, such as conflicts of
interest with defense counsel, and it adds to an increasingly over-
whelming financial burden on convicted defendants. It is time to
give up on the idea that those deemed too poor to afford an attor-
ney should qualify for a loan. The promise of Gideon, that a poor
person accused of a crime will be provided counsel by the state,
cannot be financed by the poor.
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